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The purpose of this thesis is to illuminate the pathways of Iranian influence in Iraq in 
order to provide U.S. decision makers with a possible strategy to counter Iran’s malignant 
influence there. By using a combination of social network analysis and social movement theory, 
this study illuminates the network of actors fighting Daesh in Iraq by first analyzing the network 
to map Iran’s influence channels and identify macro- and micro-level brokerage within the 
network. Using a social-movement focused approach, this study then identifies a candidate group 
for mobilization. Study of the network reveals that Iranian influence is exerted via its sponsored 
Shi’a militias and by conducting bloc recruitment of tribal militias. To counter this, the Jubouri 
tribal confederation located in Salahuddin Province offers high potential for mobilization under 
U.S. sponsorship that could be used to combat Iranian influence. 
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While there is a great effort within the United States defense establishment to 
penetrate the veil of secrecy surrounding the organization that calls itself the Islamic 
State (referred to hereafter by its Arabic nickname, Daesh1), less research has been done 
to understand one of the United States’ key allies in the fight against Daesh, the Iraqi 
Security Forces (ISF). This may be for several reasons. First, the U.S. experience in Iraq 
over the last ten years makes for a good argument that there is no need to explore such a 
well-known entity further. Second, the effort against Daesh arguably takes up the 
majority of our planners’ efforts, and trying to understand the inner dynamics of ISF is 
not worth the time.   
However, both assumptions are flawed. The ineffectiveness of the ISF, and in 
particular, the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MOD), at combatting Daesh has raised concerns 
in the United States, establishing the need to study the U.S. military’s main partner in 
Iraq. Despite having U.S.-trained and equipped formations that reasonably should have 
been able to defeat Daesh assaults, the Iraqi Army 2
nd
 Infantry Division, charged with 
protecting Mosul, abandoned its post and retreated to Baghdad in April 2014.2 Viewing 
this as a clear threat to its interests as a regional power, Iran sent a force of 500 military 
advisers to train and coordinate with Iraqi Security Forces, led by the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Quds Force Commander, General Qassem 
Suleimani.3 This move by Iran allowed the IRGC essentially to take advantage of a 
vacuum of leadership and direction within the Iraqi MOD that the United States was 
supposed to have filled. The U.S. left Iraq in 2011 without a substantial training and 
partnership effort, essentially forfeiting gains made over the previous eight years. Instead 
                                                 
1 Daesh is the Arabic acronym for “Ad-Dawlah al-Islāmīyah fī al-’Irāq wash-Shām.”  
2 Suadad Al-salhy and Tim Arango, “Sunni Militants Drive Iraqi Army Out of Mosul,” New York 
Times, June 10, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/11/world/middleeast/militants-in-mosul.html. 




of implementing a plan to maintain relationships with Iraqi counterparts, the U.S. military 
largely cut ties. Exacerbating this is the fact that the Iraqi MOD is not the same 
organization it was when the U.S. ended its combat mission in 2011. Many personnel 
selected and trained by the U.S. military were expunged from the organization in 2009 
and 2010 when former Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki fired Sunni officers from their 
posts.4 Then, on 12 November 2014, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi relieved 30 senior 
military leaders thought to be ineffective or corrupt Maliki loyalists following the defeat 
of Iraqi Security Forces in Mosul in June earlier that year.5 In a sense, the U.S. is now 
starting over in its understanding of the make-up of the Iraqi defense establishment. 
When we have little knowledge about ISF’s political orientations and ties, it is reasonable 
to assume that it would take much more time and effort to re-establish relationships with 
ISF leaders in order to counter Daesh.  
Another factor driving the need to re-examine the Iraqi Security Forces is the 
ascendance of militias and other forces on the battlefield. Due to the need for more 
forces, Iraq has partnered with and incorporated several militias into its ranks, such as the 
Kurdish Peshmerga, the Badr Organization, Ahl Asa’ib al-Haq, and Kata’ib Hezbollah, 
assisted by the Quds Force. The overt commitment by the United States’ regional 
adversary represents a threat to U.S. interests in Iraq and could possibly upset the balance 
of power in the region. In March 2014, General Lloyd J. Austin listed countering 
malignant Iranian influence as one of CENTCOM’s top 10 priorities in his posture 
statement.6 Without a greater understanding of the internal composition of the Iraqi MOD 
in the context of this new political situation; however, the U.S. is at risk of working with 
an unreliable partner in the fight against Daesh, the Iraqis, and ceding the strategic 
initiative to Iran. 
                                                 
4 Kenneth M. Pollack, “Iraq Military Situation Report” (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 
June 14, 2014), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2014/06/14-iraq-military-situation-pollack. 
5 Ahmed Ali, “Iraq’s Prime Minister Reshuffles the Security Commanders,” Institute for the Study of 
War, November 13, 2014, http://iswiraq.blogspot.com/2014/11/iraqs-prime-minister-reshuffles.html. 




1. Research Question 
The basic question this thesis will seek to answer is this: How can the United 
States counter Iranian influence within the Iraqi Defense Network (IDN), given Iran’s 
pervasive influence throughout the Iraqi government?7 To assist in answering this 
question, this thesis will answer two subsidiary questions:   
1. How is the Iraqi Defense Network organized?  
2. How can the U.S. leverage the Iraqi Defense Network to disrupt Iran’s 
influence? 
This thesis will advance CENTCOM’s priority effort through increased awareness and 
understanding of the Iraqi Security Forces. Its basic premise is that by examining the 
various organizations fighting Daesh from a network perspective, a truer power structure 
can be identified, giving strategists a better appreciation of the human domain. Once this 
power structure and the extent of Iranian influence have been identified, analysis can 
again be applied to determine suitable methods of displacing this influence through the 
entrenchment of U.S. influence. 
2. Central Claim 
This thesis’s central claim is that the application of social network analysis (SNA) 
combined with social movement theory (SMT) will yield an effective strategy to counter 
the Iranian influence prevalent throughout the Iraqi Defense Network. Combining SNA 
and SMT will yield a methodological approach that will enable a more complete 
understanding of influence within the Iraqi MOD. Following Graham Allison’s 
governmental politics model, this thesis’s main argument is predicated upon the 
assumption that the Iraqi MOD represents multiple political coalitions, some of which are 
not aligned with U.S. strategic interests. Using SNA techniques to analyze the wider Iraqi 
defense network, this thesis will identify and investigate potential brokers between the 
MOD and external actors, such as Iranian influencers. Understanding who wields 
                                                 
7 I define the Iraqi Defense Network as the various Iraqi organizations actively opposing Daesh from 
expanding across Iraq and overthrowing the Iraqi government. This includes ISF elements such as the Iraqi 
Army, the Iraqi Special Operations Forces, National Police, Kurdish Peshmerga, and non-state actor groups 
such as Sunni and Shia militia groups. 
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informal power and influence in the MOD network will allow the U.S. the ability to craft 
a suitable approach to counter Iranian influence in Iraq. 
SNA is analogous to a commander and his staff using Joint Intelligence 
Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE) to define the operational 
environment, and describe its effects on an operation. Similar to JIPOE’s goals of 
facilitating a commander’s understanding of how the operational environment constrains 
and shapes options, SNA will enable leaders and staffs to best understand how the 
structure of the Iraqi Defense Network can constrain or enable options for implementing 
a course of action.8 
Once the network has been mapped, SMT can provide a framework for 
developing a suitable course of action. SMT can help in the leveraging of organizations, 
groups, and individuals identified through SNA. Unlike engineered coup d’états, which 
can be viewed as an expedient solution with no guarantee of permanency, a social 
movement approach to countering influence provides long-term solutions to political 
problems.9 It is better than purely military solutions because of several patterns that have 
arisen during recent years. State governments, as well as other non-state groups, are 
increasingly employing non-state actors with more effectiveness, and non-military tactics 
are becoming more successful in conflicts.10 One key feature of this phenomenon is the 
level of embeddedness successful groups acquire within a target society. Those groups 
who are able to embed themselves within native social movement organizations often 
achieve lasting results that are imbued with political legitimacy. This makes SMT, with 
its emphasis on the political approach over the military, a formidable approach to craft 
strategy. 
                                                 
8 Director for Intelligence (J-2), United States Joint Staff, JP 2–01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of 
the Operational Environment (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Staff J-7, Joint Education and Doctrine, 2014), 
I–2. 
9 Doowan Lee, “A Social Movement Approach to Unconventional Warfare,” Special Warfare 
Magazine 26, no. 3 (September 2013): 31. 
10 Doowan Lee and Glenn W. Johnson, “Revisiting the Social Movement Approach to Unconventional 
Warfare,” Small Wars Journal, December 1, 2014, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/revisiting-the-
social-movement-approach-to-unconventional-warfare. 
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B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The purpose of this thesis is to trace the pathways of Iranian influence within Iraq, 
and offer an approach to counter it. It will utilize SNA (sociograms, subgroup analysis, 
centrality studies, and brokerage metrics) to analyze the Iraqi Defense Network and 
identify critical nodes within the network that contribute to its function. Next, it will shift 
its analytical lens to SMT, where a strategy will be developed to leverage the network 
and mobilize it to shift its priorities and goals to those of the US. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will explore the Iraqi network to identify actors with key brokerage 
measures using information collected using tools available through the Common 
Operational Research Environment (CORE) Lab. Its primary sources of information are 
articles from both U.S. and foreign news websites such as Al Jazeera, Al Monitor, and 
daily Iranian news roundups collected by the Critical Threats Project of the American 
Enterprise Institute, formal reports from organizations such as the Institute for the Study 
of War, and posts and uploaded photos and tweets from social media websites such as 
Facebook and Twitter.   
1. Data Collection Blueprint 
Analysis of the network will begin with an examination of SOCCENT’s 
traditional partner in Iraq, the Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF). During the initial 
investigation using open searches on Google, one prominent actor immediately came to 
the forefront: Major General Fadhil al-Barwari, the commander of ISOF’s 1st Brigade 
commonly known as the “Golden Division.”11 However, it was clear that using only 
Barwari as a starting point would lead to unnecessary bias, and other actors were 
considered to locate the boundaries of the network. Actors featured in news and social 
media related to Barwari were then investigated, as well as other well-known figures in 
Iraqi society such as politicians, religious figures, tribal leaders, and other actors, such as 
leaders of Shia militias. These actors were far enough removed from al-Barwari that their 
                                                 
11 ISOF’s Golden Division or Brigade, or ءاول لا ة قرف لا ةي ب هذ لا in Arabic. Its website for visitors is 
http://www.isof-iq.com/. 
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distance from him facilitated several start points to begin visualization and analysis of the 
network. From these seemingly unrelated actors, the network’s resulting construction is 
based on using relational ties contained within a project codebook to structure the data. 
From these sources, communication, kinship, trust, mentorship, and 
organizational ties will be identified, as will various individual attributes. This thesis uses 
ties defined in a specially designated project codebook.12 Communication ties consist of 
relaying of messages between individuals inside the network through some sort of 
medium, such as a cellular telephone or email. Kinship ties are defined as any family 
connection through blood or marriage, such as children, parents, siblings, mothers- and 
fathers-in-law, uncles, aunts, and grandparents. Ties of trust are defined as ties between 
pairs of individuals who are explicitly identified as friends or are known as trusted 
associates. Mentorship ties are defined as a relationship where an individual looks to 
another individual for educational, spiritual and/or technical advice, guidance and/or 
expertise. Organizational ties are also analyzed, ranging from military, governmental, 
non-political (defined as employment or allegiance to a specific organization that fits neither 
the criteria of a political organization nor any other type) and political groups (who seek to 
obtain political goals generally through non-violent means), to tribal affiliations and religious 
organizational ties. Individual attributes included in the analysis are current and past 
occupations, posts held, political motivations, religious affiliation, and current status 
(either dead or alive). 
Due to the variety of information available and the number of actors involved 
with internal security in Iraq, the network is loosely bounded in nominal terms, meaning 
that the coding effort is focused primarily on ISOF13 but has been expanded to include 
actors from agencies outside the ISOF, such as the Ministry of Interior, Iraqi Army, and 
prominent social and political figures. The time frame of the data collection is from 2011 
in order to maintain the focus on current events and contemporary politics. 
                                                 
12 The project codebook was designed by Associate Professor Dan Cunningham, CORE Lab, Defense 
Analysis Department as part of this study’s project team and is included in the Appendix. 
13 SOCCENT’s primary partners in Iraq. 
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Two challenges of the data collection have been in locating accurate, useful 
information and in the veracity of reporting. Because most news reporting focuses on 
events, there are fewer reports that feature information similar to what would be found in 
traditional SNA surveys, resulting in a lack of easily accessible relational data. This is 
magnified by the difficulty in verifying the accuracy and truthfulness of many reports. 
Because the reports are from foreign news agencies, there are issues both in the quality of 
the reports as well as accuracy in the translation to English. To mitigate these challenges, 
this study cross-references as many reports as possible to verify open-source reporting on 
relational ties and any political context concerning events and actors in the network with 
data collected in classified reports by SOCCENT. 
2. Thesis Organization 
The remainder of this thesis includes the following: 
Chapter II reviews literature on the theories of SNA and SMT to facilitate 
understanding of the issue. It serves as a discussion of the theories driving the data 
collection and analysis, and point out to the reader exactly where the approach utilized in 
the analysis fits between the fields of SNA and SMT, as well as how an examination of 
the Iraqi Defense Network will further our understanding of the two fields. 
Chapter III is constructed as a case study of the devolution of the Iraqi 
government following the downfall of the Saddam Hussein regime. It examines the 
history of Iran’s involvement with Iraq to illustrate how the Iranian government 
successfully mobilized Iraqi opposition forces against Saddam Hussein in the 1980s and 
the United States in 2003–2011 to attain its policy objectives. This chapter uses SMT as a 
lens to analyze Iran’s actions and provide a model to draw out significant lessons that 
will inform the strategy recommendations in Chapter V. 
Chapter IV introduces the analysis of the Iraqi Defense Network as a social 
network. It will describe the network in terms of its purpose, direction, and topography, 
and locates key nodes within the network using SNA measures of centrality and 
brokerage. It also details the extent of Iranian influence in the network, and determines 
 8 
critical areas of brokerage where a countering influence could possibly change the overall 
direction of the network. 
Chapter V then summarizes the findings from Chapters II, III, and IV to formulate 
a possible strategy to leverage the network. It draws on SMT and SNA to identify 
suitable organizations that can be leveraged to counter the pervasive Iranian influence 
throughout Iraq. The goal of this chapter is to provide a viable strategy to change the 
nature of the network so that Iranian influence is lessened, U.S. influence is increased, 
and the network’s own goals are more closely aligned with the goals of the United States. 
  
 9 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
The literature for this thesis covers two categories—social movement theory and 
social network analysis. Where the latter seeks to describe, visualize, and understand a 
group’s composition and relational power structure, the former concentrates on how to 
leverage a social organization to mobilize in pursuit of a political goal. Both theoretical 
frameworks address how influence works. This thesis generally argues that social 
network analysis will help visualize and describe the structure of relations that constitute 
potential influence in an area or environment, while social movement theory will inform 
a strategy to take exploit key players’ brokerage potential and influence within the 
network. 
A. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS  
SNA explores how people relate to one another in daily life, as well as for a 
specific function or action. Wasserman and Faust describe SNA as a perspective in which 
the theories, models, and applications are expressed as relational processes.14 The idea of 
visualizing and measuring a group’s relations began in the early 1930s with Moreno’s 
invention of the sociogram and the founding of the field of sociometry.15 This idea was 
adopted by many scientists in other fields, such as anthropology, to explain human 
behavior of individuals in situations like complex societies or communication between 
individuals participating in group problem solving. Prell writes that Forsyth and Katz 
drew from Moreno’s work to pioneer the use of matrices in SNA, arguing that matrices 
could provide a more analytic representation of social network data.16 She also notes that 
Harary and Norman were then the first to apply graph theory to SNA to analyze network 
                                                 
14 Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications 
(Structural Analysis in the Social Sciences) (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 4. 
15 Joseph L. Moreno, Who Shall Survive: A New Approach to the Problem of Human Interrelations, 
Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series 58 (Washington, DC: Nervous and Mental Disease 
Publishing Co., 1934), 10, https://archive.org/stream/whoshallsurviven00jlmo#page/n3/mode/2up; Stanley 
Wasserman and Katherine Faust, Social Network Analysis, 11. 
16 Christina Prell, Social Network Analysis: History, Theory, And Methodology (Thousand Oaks, CA: 
SAGE, 2012), 23. 
 10 
data,17 and others such as Lewin,18 Bavelas,19 Festinger,20 and Cartwright21 brought the 
concepts of social structure centrality to SNA.22 SNA evolved from these early studies, 
incorporating them all to consider the linkages between people as explanatory of social 
behavior. Instead of considering behavior solely at the individual level, SNA takes into 
consideration entire networks, starting at the dyad, or two actors with ties, level.23 SNA 
maintains that actors in a network are interdependent, vice independent, and that these 
ties also serve as conduits for the flow of resources.24  The applications of this have 
inherent value; SNA is a powerful tool that facilitates situational awareness of the human 
domain of an operational environment as well as increased understanding of a friendly or 
enemy group. 
The basic tenets of SNA are examined by authors such as Everton; McCulloh, 
Armstrong and Johnson; Kadushin; and Borgatti and Everett. Written to analyze and 
disrupt covert and illicit networks, Everton’s work introduces the basic concepts of SNA, 
how to implement analysis using SNA software programs, how to analyze networks to 
compute a network or actor’s importance, and how to create strategies to affect the 
network.25 McCulloh, Armstrong, and Johnson elaborate on the basic concepts of SNA 
and apply the concept to organizational risk.26 They define organizational risk as 
uncertainty in the achievement of an organization’s objectives, existing in the form of 
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vulnerabilities of nodes within the network.27 Kadushin seeks to analyze the general 
concepts and theories of SNA and present them in a more accessible form to students 
who are new to the subject of SNA.28 Borgatti and Everett focus on giving the reader an 
introduction to network focused research. Their work, intended to familiarize one with 
the theory and methodology of network analysis research, explains not only the nature of 
the analysis itself of SNA, but also how to chart a network and test hypotheses in order to 
answer research questions. They are similar to Kadushin in their focus on the mechanics 
of SNA, but differ slightly by concentrating on how to develop and conduct a study of a 
network.   
Fundamental to this thesis’ treatment of the Iraqi MOD are the concepts of 
centrality, cohesive subgroups, and brokers and bridges. Centrality is the most intuitive 
SNA concept for many, and measures how important actors are in a network.29 The 
notion of centrality means that some actors will have better access to other people, 
resources, and information, which implies that they have more influence within an 
organization, implying that these actors are more powerful.30 Moreno was among the first 
to study the notion that some actors were more important than others in a network. His 
work on who was a star and who was an isolate in a network laid the groundwork for 
further study of centrality.31 Freeman,32 Bonacich,33 and Borgatti and Everett34 refined 
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Moreno’s work to establish what are now standard measures of centrality for SNA 
analysts.35 
Everton identifies four major measures of centrality as: degree centrality that 
measures each actor’s number of ties; closeness centrality that considers the path 
distances between each actor in the network; betweenness centrality, which calculates the 
extent to which an actor lies on the shortest paths between all other actors; and 
eigenvector centrality, which measures actor centrality by considering the centrality of 
each actor’s alter network.36 In other words, an actor with high eigenvector centrality has 
a personal network consisting of contacts that are also important and well connected.37 
Measuring the centrality scores of each actor determines which actors in the network hold 
the most social influence over the network, as opposed to who holds the most senior 
position within a network. Thus, knowing an actor’s centrality and influence will 
facilitate locating key actors. 
To measure an actor’s influence, or brokerage, this thesis utilizes such 
calculations as betweenness centrality, Burt’s constraint, and Borgatti’s key-player 
algorithm. Granovetter introduces the idea of brokerage, explaining that weak ties are 
what allow brokers to be brokers. Defining the strength of a tie as the combination of 
time, emotional intensity, intimacy, and reciprocity, Granovetter distinguishes between 
weak ties and strong ties as a matter of degree.38 He explains that a bridge is a tie in a 
network that is the only path between two subgroups, and that due to their transitive 
nature strong ties cannot be bridges (except in small groups).39 Strong ties also 
encapsulate actors in a subgroup; by sharing and reinforcing ideas with no outside 
contact, new information and resource inflow to a group becomes limited.40 Granovetter 
summarizes by stating that weak ties as bridges are indispensable to maintaining larger 
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social cohesion and are an important resource in communicating and mobilizing 
resources.41 
Ronald Burt, however, takes issue with the notion that only weak ties can act as 
bridges. Instead of examining the ties between subgroups, Burt concentrates on holes in 
the structure of a network between clusters. He argues that the causal agent of the 
information reception phenomena (getting better info from distant contacts as opposed to 
close) is the structural hole, not the weak tie.42 Burt contends that tie strength is an aside 
when considering information flow, and that the focus of a strategic player in a network 
should be on maintaining tie strength.43 By developing strong ties across structural holes, 
an actor will increase his information flow within his ego network. The accumulation of 
these ties across holes will increase an actor’s brokerage. To measure this, Burt 
introduces the measure of constraint to measure how much an actor is in a position of 
brokerage by considering the types of triads the actor is involved in, weighting these by 
that actor’s number of ties, and summing the results.44 Burt’s constraint algorithm is 
helpful for correlating other scores, such as betweenness, eigenvector centrality, and key 
player scores to identify brokerage. 
Borgatti builds on the ideas of centrality and brokerage with his idea of locating 
individuals who are important to the network.45 Borgatti’s algorithms focus on how 
actors contribute to the cohesion of a network, and measure both actors whose removal 
will most fragment the network (KPP-Neg) and actors who are the most connected and 
embedded within the network (KPP-Pos).46 An actor with high scores in either measure 
will have higher centrality scores, and will be also be a cut-point or boundary spanner in 
one or more bi-component. Borgatti explains that KPP-Pos metrics can be used to 
                                                 
41 Ibid., 1373. 
42 Ronald S. Burt, “The Social Structure of Competition,” in Networks and Organizations:Structure, 
Form, and Action, ed. Nitin Nohria and Robert G. Eccles (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School 
Press, 1993), 73. 
43 Ibid., 75. 
44 Everton, Dark Networks, 255–256. 
45 Stephen P. Borgatti, “Identifying Sets of Key Player in a Social Network,” Computational, 
Mathematical, and Organizational Theory 12 (2006): 21, doi:10.1007/s10588-006-7084-x. 
46 Ibid., 22. 
 14 
identify which actors are best in position to take maximize the utilization of resources, 
while KPP-Neg metrics identify those who are in positions that will maximize the 
benefits of brokerage, gatekeeping, and playing one group off of another.47 This thesis 
will test the algorithms’ ability to locate actors who hold large amounts of influence. I 
agree with Borgatti’s KPP-Neg algorithm’s goals of identifying brokerage in the 
traditional sense as a valid and necessary measure to understand; however, I intend to 
utilize the KPP-Pos algorithm to find actors who are the most highly embedded to 
distinguish levels of reach and influence in the MOD network. 
Understanding which groups an actor is a member of is critical to understanding 
his motivations and brokerage potential. Network cohesion measures identify subgroups 
and can show how different groups are juxtaposed in a network.48 A group’s 
cohesiveness is generally defined as its resistance to fracture, in terms of the minimum 
number of connections it would take to break apart the group.49 Studying network 
cohesion gives analysts an understanding of a network’s characteristics, its resiliency, 
and prevents haphazard strategy. Sageman discusses these characteristics in his 
examination of the structural composition of al-Qaeda, to explore how the group could be 
defeated. He describes al-Qaeda’s network topography as a “small world” network 
resembling the Internet, where, similar to small sites sending and receiving information to 
larger sites, individual actors and small groups were connected to more important actors 
and groups that Sageman refers to as “hubs,” highlighting these actors’ centrality and 
brokerage potential.50 This led to his recommendation that the U.S. stop trying to kill an 
organization’s leadership or interdict terrorists at its borders, and instead focus on 
collapsing an organization by targeting hubs.  
Everton and Wasserman and Faust explain the basic measures of sub-group 
detection, and discuss the differences between them. Wasserman and Faust’s basic 
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properties of cohesive subgroups outlines what makes subgroups cohesive.51 Group 
structure varies from simple, as in the case of simple clique of three inter-connected 
actors, to increasingly complex, where inconsistencies in Girvan-Newman grouping can 
show actors with brokerage potential. Girvan-Newman grouping measures the 
connections between actors and systematically removes edges between actors based on 
the edges’ betweenness score to calculate cohesion and identify subgroups. Of the 
various methods, Everton considers this one as the most advance for detecting 
subgroups.52 Everton does not consider cliques in his treatment of SNA because of the 
unrealistic assumptions that underlie clique membership. In my analysis, however, I find 
that with a smaller group of actors who have ties to disparate subgroups, the clique 
membership provided a good visual analysis of the different circles one actor could 
belong in. Similar to real life, it is helpful to understand who is in which clique.  
B. SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 
Social Movement Theory literature embraces the ideas of influence and power 
described in SNA and explores how to leverage these networks in pursuit of political 
goals. Similar to SNA theory, the idea of influence within social movement organizations 
is key to leveraging a network’s brokerage potential. Max Weber’s work on authority is 
foundational in understanding influence and control. Weber establishes three types of 
historical authority, or control: rational, traditional, and charismatic. Speaking from an 
economic point of view, Weber demonstrates how each type of leader in the three 
systems maintains control of society and interacts with his staff.53 Somewhat opposite in 
his ideation of authority and legitimacy to Weber is Schwartz. Leadership, according to 
Schwartz, was epitomized in General Washington as the harnessing of the virtue of the 
men under his command towards defeating the enemy, as opposed to Weber’s traditional 
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charismatic hero.54 Nepstad and Bob discuss different types of leadership capital, arguing 
that leadership capital is formed of resources that an actor can use to exert influence over 
others, consists of cultural capital, social capital in the form of numerous strong and weak 
ties within the actor’s network and to other networks, and symbolic capital.55 Social 
capital can be visualized by using SNA to show the amount and type of ties each actor 
has within a social network. Nepstad and Bob also talk about the importance of weak ties, 
referring to Granovetter’s concept, to explain the importance of the leader’s ability to 
interact with the media, Internet, and other communications outlets to rally support for 
the social movement.56 Similarly, in her article on the causes of growth in Italian left-
wing radical organizations, della Porta also notes the importance of social networks in 
leveraging both strong and weak ties to recruit new members. Through her interviewing 
of Italian terrorists, she finds that in 70% of her studied cases new recruits had at least 
one friend in the organization they joined, and that in 42% of these, new recruits had 
more than seven.57 Often the new recruits were next-door neighbors, school friends, or 
close family members.58 Della Porta’s discovery of social network embeddedness as a 
driver of mobilization confirmed the importance that relationships take when mobilizing 
illicit or underground networks.59 Aminzade, Goldstone, and Perry claim in their work 
that by focusing on a leader’s (or team’s) actions, one can identify the role of leadership 
dynamics in social movements.60 The authors contend that there are two basic leadership 
dimensions—task oriented and people oriented.61 These two dimensions embody the 
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necessary functions of leaders, from motivation to planning and building the organization 
that may eventually replace the incumbent government it seeks to replace. The authors 
argue that both are necessary, and that to have one without the other in a revolutionary 
movement risks failure.  
Whereas many popular treatments and literature about social networks tend to 
describe them as flat, or decentralized, it is important to appreciate that networks will 
have both horizontal and vertical, or hierarchical, structure. Critical to a network’s 
horizontal structure is the concept of brokerage. Defined in Han’s article as “a process 
‘by which intermediary actors facilitate transactions between other actors lacking access 
to or trust in one another,’”62 brokerage in SMT is highly similar to SNA, where actors 
exist in social networks who can bridge gaps in communication to transfer information, 
materials, or other types of support to facilitate action. Brokers also being influencers, 
they unite separate groups to bring about unified action. Han and Clarke each note the 
significant ability of brokers to galvanize action amongst disparate groups. These authors 
show that the resistance groups who were most involved the American Revolution and 
Egyptian Uprising of 2011 would not have been as successful in mobilizing their forces 
without inter-connected actors such as Paul Revere, Joseph Warren, and Mohamed Adel, 
a leader of the Egyptian 6 April Youth Movement. These brokers linked together groups 
and provided them with a unity of effort that would not have been there otherwise. Han 
focuses on Revere and Warren’s membership in several revolutionary societies in Boston 
as a key indicator of brokerage potential. Their association in multiple organizations and 
unique positions in society created ties for Revere and Warren that bridged the structural 
holes between the many revolutionary societies, which lacked central leadership and 
direction.63 Clarke focuses on the placement of actors within the overall societal network 
to determine brokerage. He discusses the efforts of Egyptian labor and human rights 
NGO leaders, moderate Muslim Brotherhood leadership (all young MB members), and 
other political opposition groups to mobilize against the Mubarak regime in the aftermath 
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of the Tunisian government’s overthrow.64 What each of these actors had in common was 
his location on the peripheries of Egyptian society. Due to their willingness to work with 
outside organizations, they were in a better position to hear about the 6 April Youth 
Movement’s plans to protest against the Mubarak regime, and convince the MB senior 
leadership to support the protests. 
Widely spread, decentralized social networks are highly resilient against outside 
attack and can connect a larger number of people. However, literature on leadership in 
the form of patronage shows that it is important, if not critical, to identify and understand 
patronage to discover brokers who perceive events with greater understanding and can 
provide direction to a movement. Padgett and Ansell’s work on the rise of the Medici 
family of Florence, Italy, in the early 1400s is a logical start point to learn about 
patronage. They analyze how Cosimo de’Medici, the patron of the Medici family, turned 
his family’s status from elite outcasts to the leading family of Florentine by establishing 
ties between disparate networks, all of whom were either tied to or dependent on Medici 
for support.65  
Auyero, Lapegna, and Poma investigate patronage in the form of clientelism.66 
They argue that, as opposed to popular theory, vertically structured patron-client 
networks are not an impediment to collective action. In fact, political actors take 
advantage of other social networks to facilitate politically motivated collective action 
against other organizations or portions of their governments.67 Gould, on the other hand, 
tests the difference between having authority and having resources for actors in brokerage 
positions. He hypothesizes that brokers’ structural position between oppositional factions 
enhances their influence.68 However, these brokers are not able to mix the influence 
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gained from impartiality with the influence from their ability to mobilize resources. Osa 
considers patronage under conditions of repression in her analysis of the development of 
opposition networks in communist Poland. Using the opposition movement in Poland 
from 1956 to 1981 as a case study, she shows how opposition groups exploit political 
opportunities to organize, mobilize, and conduct collective action in pursuit of political 
objectives. While she does not explicitly discuss the brokerage between opposition 
networks of the Catholic community and other organizations, brokerage is implicit in her 
description of how the Catholic oppositional groups served to carry on the message of 
opposition despite numerous attacks against the network by Polish communist 
authorities.69 
Each of the authors studied generally agree on the concept of brokerage and its 
definition. Padgett and Ansel discuss Medici’s campaign of “robust action” to describe 
the Medici family’s style of using influence to further its goals.70 Gould borrows 
Marsden’s definition of brokerage to frame interaction between structurally influent 
actors and their network.71 Auyero et al. treat brokerage as a political transaction, where 
the broker, in return for a pledge of political support, provides financial or other materiel 
support to actors or organizations.72 While Osa does not describe any one opposition 
organization as a broker specifically, she points out that one of the essential requirements 
for political opportunity is availability and access to influential allies.73 Each article 
reviewed describes a different aspect of brokerage, which when considered as a group, 
provides a broader understanding of what a broker provides and how he influences a 
network. 
While the above-mentioned readings generally agree on the concept of brokerage, 
there is disagreement over the pursuit of personal or organizational interests while in a 
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structurally influential role (or other broker role). In his analysis, Gould demonstrates that 
power stemming from the ability to mobilize resources negatively correlates with power 
derived from brokerage capacity. He concludes that the use of resources as a mobilization 
tool erodes the aura of impartiality necessary to maintain credibility as an influential 
broker and mediator.74 In this matter, I disagree with Gould’s assessment, and find that 
this conflicts with the idea of “robust action” defined by Padgett and Ansell. Padgett and 
Ansell use the idea of multivocality—interpreting actions from multiple perspectives 
simultaneously—to argue that Medici overcame the dichotomy between impartiality and 
self-interest.75 By concealing and obfuscating his intentions and committing to several 
different efforts (requests from friends), Medici was able to grow in power. In contrast, 
Gould uses a narrow definition brokerage— mediating between enemy factions— to 
demonstrate that self-interest is counter to brokerage. While there are situations where 
impartiality is beneficial in arbitration, I believe it is preferable to incorporate self-
interest into calculations of brokerage capacity to determine an actor’s influence.   
In assessing existing literature on SNA and SMT, it is apparent that the two fields 
are interrelated. The SNA literature is fairly unanimous in its acceptance of certain 
measurements, such as actor centralities. The distinctions between the studied authors 
were not so much disputes about theory as they were variations in the methods with 
which to approach SNA. Each difference studied could be used in conjunction with other 
approaches without issue. SMT literature, on the other hand, placed emphasis on different 
aspects of social movements. Some authors focused more on leadership aspects, while 
others described how brokerage and influence permeated and were used by the movement 
organizations to accomplish their goals. Both schools of thought, however, recognized 
the importance of brokerage at the individual, group, and network level. This recognition 
is also where I identified a gap in the understanding of influence between the two areas. 
SNA helps to understand what networks are and how they are composed, and visualizes 
influence in terms of an actor’s structural position and control of critical resources within 
a network. SMT, on the other hand, informs understanding into which factors influence 
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and enable networks to mobilize to accomplish political objectives. In this sense, the 
literature on the two subjects shows that they are complementary in understanding the 
nature of influence. 
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III. IRANIAN INFLUENCE AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 
MODEL 
Iran’s position in Iraq today is a result of its long sponsorship of Shia oppositional 
groups. Beginning with the war between Iran and Iraq at the beginning of the 1980s, Iran 
has leveraged such groups as the Islamic Da’wa Party, or al-Da’wa, and the Supreme 
Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq as a means to achieve its policy goals. Today, the 
upheaval caused by the rise of Daesh has created a new opportunity for Iran to expand its 
power in Iraq. However, to better understand how this turn of events is necessary to 
understand how and why Iran is able to exert its power throughout Iraq. Here the political 
process model offers the means to provide such an understanding. To analyze Iran’s 
increasing influence in Iraq, it must be viewed from its main mechanism. In this case, the 
sponsored Shi’a political parties such as the Da’wa Party and the SCIRI embody Iranian 
influence through these groups’ shared history of social insurgency to change the Iraqi 
political landscape. McAdam’s political process model offers a useful framework to 
appreciate the method behind Iran’s strategy and shed light on its influence within the 
Iraqi government.76 Furthermore, it can assist the U.S. with developing better courses of 
action to disrupt Iranian influence throughout Iraq and the greater Middle East. By 
analyzing two key periods of upheaval, the Iran-Iraq War and the U.S.-Iraq War of 2003–
2011, a pattern can be discerned that shows how Iran manipulated the political 
opportunities structure for certain Iraqi oppositional groups and then leveraged their 
organizational strength, gaining Iran access and placement within Iraqi political circles 
necessary to implement its long-term strategy of political dominance in Iraq.   
A. REVIEW OF THE MCADAM POLITICAL PROCESS MODEL 
McAdam’s political process model frames the rise of Iranian influence in 
contemporary Iraq as a successful mobilization of organic social movements. It explains 
the generation of social insurgency as the convergence of three major factors: political 
opportunities structure, indigenous organizational strength, and cognitive liberation are 
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all reflected in the changing socio-economic environment and are each necessary for 
insurgency to take place.77 Considering psychological strain and other environmental 
conditions to be important but insufficient by themselves to lead to insurgency, this 
approach differs from the classical model of social revolution.78 He rejects the idea that 
social movements are illogical reactions to societal strain, and instead argues that social 
movements are a way for those who do not have power to contest the ruling elite for 
control.79 A second model compared to the political process model is the resource 
mobilization model. McAdams agrees with this model in that he considers a social 
movement to be a rational reaction by groups lacking political power to advance their 
political interests, but rejects the idea that only political elites have access to the 
resources necessary for mobilization.80 Instead, the political process model regards the 
differences in power between groups as temporary and open to influence. Non-ruling 
groups have the inherent ability to challenge the status quo by provoking social change 
through transforming their collective consciousness and taking advantage of favorable 
environmental conditions to elevate their standing vis-à-vis the political elites and engage 
in collective action.81  
The political process model first considers the opportunities available to 
undertake collective action by analyzing the broad external processes that shape a 
political system.82 Socioeconomic changes over time such as industrialization, 
urbanization, and increased education and social mobility opportunities can alter the basic 
societal structure of a culture, changing the potential leveraging capacity of groups 
without rearranging the corresponding power structures. In contrast, instability created by 
wars, large-scale strikes or other episodes of unrest disrupt the balance of power between 
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members and challengers and create immediate opportunities for any group sufficiently 
organized to seize power for themselves; the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s successful 
rise to power following the ousting of Mubarak in 2011 is suggestive of such a 
situation.83 A social movement’s organizational strength is contingent upon these 
changes as well as its ability to translate opportunities into political action. This ability, in 
turn, depends on the level of organization present in the larger social community in which 
movements are based. Without extensive organization, aggrieved populations are often 
limited to short-term localized efforts and are unable to go beyond protests and riots.84 As 
the Arab Spring in Egypt demonstrated, the results of an increased structure of political 
opportunities are twofold: a social movement’s organization’s chances of successful 
insurgency are improved, and the ability of the ruling elite to repress a burgeoning 
movement is reduced.85   
In addition to increased opportunity, the mobilization of resources grants a 
minority the capacity to conduct a successful insurgency. Without resources, a challenger 
will likely be unable to act on political opportunities despite having the will to do so.86 
The ability of a social movement to apply its resources, which McAdam terms the 
“conversion potential,” relies on the movement’s capacity to gather and use four main 
resource components: members, communications structure, solidary incentives, and 
leadership.87 The power to recruit new members is the greatest resource social 
organizations have to offer. McAdam writes that no matter how disaffected a potential 
recruit is, he must necessarily come into contact with some representative from a 
prospective movement organization if he wishes to act on his disaffection in an organized 
manner.88 The recruitment of individuals then, typically runs through already established 
lines of communication built on existing relationships. Similarly important is the 
communications network structure that embedded social organizations provide, which 
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facilitates both the ability for a new movement to take hold and its ability to mobilize 
resources. McAdam points to the theory of cultural diffusion, stating that the degree of 
social interrelatedness of actors within a community affects the ability of movement 
organizers to gain social acceptance and support from their targeted community. The 
more these organizers are embedded within their communities, the more likely it is that 
they will influence their communities to embrace social revolution.89 The utilization of 
solidary incentives helps social movement organizers solve the “free-rider” problem, 
which occurs when both participants and non-participants can benefit from a social 
movement’s efforts regardless of whether they participate, thus leading some to “free-
ride” on the efforts of others.90 A social movement can overcome this problem by co-
opting already established social organizations, whose members are already committed to 
their organizations’ respective causes and which possess a motivating force sufficient to 
encourage their members to engage in collective action. Leadership is the resource that 
ties the other main resource components together and can help guide the expansion of a 
social movement. Leaders are often the first to be recruited for a larger movement, and by 
virtue of their embeddedness can spur the adoption of a movement’s goals, organize its 
recruiting efforts, and direct communications to galvanize support of the new 
movement.91 Viewed from this perspective, it becomes absolutely critical to gain the 
support of local leadership when seeking to leverage indigenous organizations to support 
a social movement. 
Cognitive liberation, which is not considered by either the classic or resource 
mobilization models, is the third factor of McAdam’s model. It details the process by 
which individuals react to the changes occurring in their political environment and decide 
to engage in political action.92 This is the critical link between potential and action, and 
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depends on the meaning people give to their situation.93 The attribution of significance is 
a crucial factor in the generation of insurgency, and without this it is unlikely that an 
insurgency movement will be able to gain or support.94 In his description of cognitive 
cueing, McAdam uses the three-part cognitive process developed by Piven and Cloward 
where people first perceive that their governing system has lost legitimacy, then begin to 
believe that they have a right to change, and then finally come to think that they possess 
the capability to effect this change themselves.95 The observations themselves are not 
based on factual evidence so much as cues taken from others within each person’s larger 
social group. The extent of the diffusion and acceptance of such cues depends on the 
strength of the ties within the social group, or its level of social integration.96 Without a 
highly integrated community, cognitive liberation would be unlikely to take place. 
Instead, less integrative communities would tend to explain their problems as a “function 
of individual rather than situational factors,” blaming problems on individual issues 
rather than “system attributions.”97 People in these types of communities would likely not 
see their problems as fixable, even if they recognized that the cause was outside their 
control. Highly interactive communities, on the other hand, would likely have more 
system attributions. This is significant to social movements because only system 
attributions are found to provide the necessary motivation to engage in sustained 
collective action.98 This makes the existence of embedded social organizations even more 
important to the political process model because cognitive liberation is expected to occur 
primarily though these networks.99 
As an alternative theory of social insurgency, the political process model is useful 
in analyzing social movements and collective action because it balances external and 
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internal factors to explain how social insurgency emerges. Political opportunities arise 
from both broad, long-term changes in the macro environment as well as acute periods of 
instability that undermine the status quo and provide challenger groups with the power to 
rearrange the political structure. To do this, these groups must convert their main 
resources from unfocused, potential power to directed action against the established 
political elite. Importantly, if a movement can leverage indigenous organizational 
strengths to seize these opportunities, it has a much greater chance of engaging in 
collective action against the government. 
B. REGIME CRISIS LEADS TO OPPORTUNITY   
Iran’s involvement in the current crisis in Iraq is the latest turn in a 30-year effort 
by Iran to ensure regime survival and maintain a competitive edge in the regional balance 
of power.100 Iran’s strategy, when viewed through the lens of the political process model, 
yields several noteworthy insights as to how it took advantage of increased political 
opportunities by utilizing Shia oppositional movements. Part of Iran’s long-term regional 
strategy appears to be ensuring that political movements loyal to Iran are placed in 
control of Iraq following the resolution of conflict.101 It began as part of Iran’s strategy to 
undermine Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, and has continued through the 
U.S.-Iraq War of 2003, the subsequent U.S. occupation and installation of the current 
Iraqi government, and the current crisis Iraq faces today. Iran initiated its strategy to 
influence Iraqi politics by sponsoring opposition parties in the 1980s and 1990s to fight 
against Saddam Hussein, and leveraged these groups to direct politics within the new 
Iraqi government and direct proxy forces against U.S. forces.102 The Shia community in 
Iraq has provided a highly organized indigenous structure that Iran has successfully 
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utilized for its own ends. As a pool of resources, the Iraqi Shia have provided two of the 
most critical components: a robust supply of members, most of who were committed to 
the removal of Saddam Hussein, and a community which has maintained a healthy 
communications network both inside Iraq and outside throughout the greater Middle 
East.103 The two initial movement organizations, the Da’wa Party and the Supreme 
Islamic Council for Iraq, have had in place for many years an active leadership aligned 
with Iran’s goal of Islamic government and who are now receptive to Iranian aid to 
combat Daesh.104 
The formation of Shia oppositional groups was initially aided by widespread 
socio-economic changes within Iraqi society. These altered the power structures within 
Iraq, which increased the Shia community’s awareness of political opportunities although 
the status quo between elite Sunni leaders and challenger Shia groups remained 
unchanged. These socio-economic changes have their roots in events that arose over sixty 
years ago. Before the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq underwent a long period of political instability 
coupled with macroeconomic changes culminating in the Ba’ath Party’s rise to power. 
Post-World War II urbanization also had a major impact on Iraqi society, changing a 
primarily pastoral, tribal-based society focused on subsistence farming to an agricultural, 
tenant-based one with a new focus on commerce in oil and manufacturing.105 This 
resulted in a significant concentration of the populace in urban areas, condensing 
people’s social circles and bringing people into closer contact with others outside their 
sphere. Following the Ba’athist coup of 1958, nationalization of the country’s industry 
caused a major slowdown of manufacturing growth as well as a flight of capital, 
essentially bankrupting the country.106  The Ba’athists reacted to this by creating several 
state-run entities for its major sub-sectors. Due to its socialist policies, however, it was 
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nearly impossible to lay people off and the system became bloated with workers, creating 
tension within the country and dissatisfaction by the Iraqi populace.107   
In the late 1970s, the rapid increase in oil revenues brought on by the 
nationalization of the Iraqi Petrol Company’s oil fields as well as more liberal economic 
policies, created new opportunities for Shia Iraqis— normally lower class— to increase 
their wealth.108 Additionally, Saddam Hussein enacted broad educational programs that 
offered mostly free university education to all citizens, which raised literacy rates 
throughout the country.109 These trends and policies allowed the Shia to move up the 
social and economic ladders, marking the beginning of what McAdam calls a “thaw” in 
the political system, which in turn altered the Shia community’s structure of political 
opportunities.110 
1. Iraq in the 1970s and 1980s: The Iranian Revolution and the Iran-
Iraq War 
Iran’s current influence strategy and mobilization of internal groups in Iraq can be 
traced to its effort to dispose of the Saddam Hussein regime during the 1980s. The war 
between Iraq and Iran created an intense political crisis that Iran seized upon as its first 
opportunity to increase its regional influence. Prior to beginning of the Iran-Iraq War, 
Iran sought to gain an advantage over Iraq by sponsoring oppositional groups including 
the Da’wa Party, the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, the Kurdish 
Democratic Party, Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (IMK), and the Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan.111 
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Beginning in the late 1970s heightened political tension between Iran and Iraq 
helped destabilize the political status quo in Iraq, allowing Iraqi opposition groups to 
further mobilize. The first signs of instability appeared in 1977, when the Ba’ath Party 
closed the Shia pilgrimage sites in Karbala after suspecting a terrorist attack during the 
height of religious ceremonies there.112 This act sparked violent protests by Shia Iraqis, 
which were only quelled after the Army was brought in.113 Following these riots, the 
Ba’ath Party responded by executing several key Shia clergy members, to include the 
arrest and later execution of Ayatollah Baqr al-Sadr, one of Iraq’s leading clerics.114 
Iraq’s decision to expel thousands of Iranian Shia living in Iraq in 1974 by repressing the 
Shia community and Iraq’s later deportation of Khomeini further exacerbated the 
worsening political status quo by creating the conditions that contributed to Iraq’s 
decision to initiate war against Iran.115 After its establishment, the new theocratic regime 
in Iran immediately denounced Saddam Hussein by openly calling for Islamic revolution 
in Iraq and sponsoring Shia opposition groups’ efforts against him.116 In addition to open 
agitation, Iran began to sponsor Kurdish and Shia opposition groups to begin attacking 
Ba’ath Party officials.117 The Ba’ath government responded to this by banning opposition 
groups, arresting anyone suspected of being a member or having a connection to the 
group, and deporting several thousand ethnic Iranians from Iraq to Iran.118 These actions 
by the Ba’athist government effectively repressed the Shia community and limited its 
level of “insurgent consciousness.”119 These measures were largely circumvented, 
however, with the onset of war. The war between Iran and Iraq became a crisis that 
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erased the political status quo to the point that Iranian sponsored opposition groups could 
mobilize without fear of political repression. Throughout the war, groups used by Iran to 
target Iraqi officials became irregular units who on the front lines of the war with Iranian 
forces against the Ba’athists.120 Two of the larger organizations, the Da’wa Party and the 
Badr Brigades, continued their efforts against Ba’athist Iraq after the war officially 
ended: the Badr Brigades became formally constituted under the IRGC, while the Da’wa 
Party organized efforts throughout the Middle East to establish Islamist regimes.121 The 
long period of political instability and continued sponsorship transformed Iraq’s 
opposition groups from political activists to fully fledge proxy forces combatting Iraq. 
The Ba’athist repression of the Shia Iraqis and Kurds provided the impetus for 
opposition parties and other organizations to seek out Iran’s help, and gave Iran the 
opportunity to leverage two already mobilized social groups to conduct attacks against 
Iraq at the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War. Common religious background and heritage 
made the selection of the Da’wa Party an easy choice for Iran to begin its destabilization 
of Iraq. Started in 1958 by influential Iraqi Shia clergy such as Ayatollah Sayyid 
Muhammad Baqir as-Sadr, the Da’wa Party strongly desired an Islamic government in 
Iraq.122 As-Sadr and his followers were deeply embedded within the Shia community, 
which lent their efforts additional credibility and allowed them to reach numerous smaller 
communities and influence potential recruits. Its members were historically and 
ideologically allied with the Iranian Shia leadership; when the Iranian government was 
overthrown in the Islamic revolution, the Da’wa Party made Islamist governance one of 
its own goals as well. The Da’wa Party’s leadership was receptive to Iranian influence, 
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readily adopting Iranian goals as their own and communicating the ideas and narrative 
frame throughout the network. As the founding leader of the Da’wa movement, Sadr was 
the ideal candidate to steer the Da’wa Party and the larger Shia community. A leading 
religious scholar, Sadr pioneered many of the original ideas of Islamist government that 
Iran used to create a theocracy after assuming power such as Islamic economic theory 
and the structure of Islamist government, and led the development of the Islamist group’s 
structure and doctrine.123 As a retaliatory measure for his opposition to the Ba’ath Party, 
Hussein executed him.124 During the war, Nouri al-Maliki also rose to a position of 
leadership within the ranks of Da’wa Party fighters and continued to direct efforts against 
the Hussein regime from outside Iraq after the war ended; his intent fit nicely with Iran’s 
and enabled Iran to use his leadership to continue to pressure Iraq.125 Maliki 
accomplished this widespread effort through the well-established communications 
structure within the Da’wa movement, as well as through the larger Shia religious 
network. The communications network for al Da’wa consisted of party cells layered in 
cellular structure throughout Iraq, the Gulf states and Lebanon, and the religious schools, 
or hawza, where leading clerics taught Islamist doctrine and anti-communism among 
Shia student clerics.126 Al-Maliki built on the ideas disseminated by Sadr who had 
supported Iran’s revolution by sending messages targeting the Arabic population of Iran 
(located in the province of Khuzestan) to support Khomeini’s revolution on the grounds 
that the state Iran was creating represented a continuation of the true nation founded by 
the Prophet Muhammad.127 
Iran was also able to incorporate into its strategy non-Shia opposition groups, 
notably, the IMK. In the north, the IMK fought against the Ba’ath regime due to their 
opposition to Pan-Arabism versus Islamism; Iran was crucial in providing the fledgling 
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group with training, operational support, financial support and sanctuary in Iran.128 The 
Iranians approached the founder of the group, Sheikh Othman Abdul-Aziz to develop an 
Islamist-focused Kurdish militia to have a more ideologically compatible militia group 
fighting the Ba’athists in northern Iraq.129 Although perhaps not a crucial player in the 
overall Iranian strategy, the IMK did indeed allow Iran to increase its reach through 
indigenous populations. 
Iran’s support to these proxy forces is almost a textbook example of resource 
mobilization in the sense of a political organization converting necessary resources into 
collective action, marking the first instance where it obtained access and placement 
within groups acting in Iraq that would serve as its agents. After the war between Iran 
and Iraq ended, Da’wa and SCIRI each played a prominent role in continuing the 
opposition to the Saddam Hussein regime and were among the first to return to Iraq after 
his regime was overthrown in 2003; IMK remained armed until 2003 when it joined the 
Kurdish Regional Government. Iran’s influence strategy would pay off again years later, 
as the groups would assume increasingly larger roles in the Iraqi political system and 
members of these groups who had continued their opposition to Saddam, such as Nouri 
al-Maliki, would eventually take roles in the Iraqi provisional government following his 
ouster. 
2. Iraq in the 2000s: The U.S.-Iraq War (2003–2011) 
The 2003 U.S. invasion provided Iran with its next opening to take advantage of 
the destroyed status quo in Iraq and extend its reach throughout the Middle East. 
Reminiscent of the chaos and opportunity presented by the political turmoil and war in 
the late 1970s and 1980s, Iran and its main sponsored groups used the aftermath of the 
2003 defeat of the Ba’athist regime to return to Iraq and be accepted as partners in the 
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effort to re-shape the government by the U.S.-led coalition.130 Iran acted to increase its 
influence through Iraq in order to pursue its main policy goals of ensuring Iraqi 
dependence on Iranian patronage for defense, economic, and political matters.131 Iran’s 
immediate strategic goals following the downfall of Hussein were to support the 
establishment of a dominant Shia political bloc and to train, equip and support pro-
Iranian militias.132 To establish the necessary political coalition, Iran was well prepared 
with pre-selected politicians, such as the previously discussed Nouri al-Maliki of the 
Da’wa Party and Abdul Azziz al-Hakim of the SCIRI. These two never really stopped 
fighting against the Ba’athists; Al-Maliki continued his opposition through political 
activism as well as clandestine warfare in Tehran and later Syria. He maintained close 
ties with both Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon as he worked to conduct attacks against the 
Hussein regime throughout the Middle East in the period preceding the 2003 war.133   
Similar to Maliki, Abdul Azziz Al-Hakim was another long-time Iranian proxy 
involved in Iraqi politics. He founded the SCIRI and was also the first commander of its 
militant wing, the Badr Brigades.134 Hakim rose to prominence in post-war Iraq when, in 
its attempt to hasten the recovery from the war, the U.S. rushed to assemble an elected 
assembly to begin rebuilding the shattered country. By selecting Hakim to be one of the 
five leaders of the new government, U.S. General Jay Garner provided the Iranians with 
the opportunity to control the political landscape.135 His selection over other influential 
Shia leaders like Maliki was somewhat ironic; al-Hakim was selected over Maliki 
because the Da’wa party resisted dealing with the Pentagon and DOD, instead preferring 
to work with civilians.136 
                                                 
130 Felter and Fishman, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq,” 26. 
131 Kenneth Katzman, “Iran-Iraq Relations,” Congressional Research Report (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, August 13, 2010), 2, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22323.pdf. 
132 Ibid., 1–2. 
133 “Nouri Al-Maliki - Biography,” Biography, accessed March 16, 2015, 
http://www.biography.com/people/nouri-al-maliki-504526. 
134 Chiara Sulmoni, “Abdul Aziz Al-Hakim : A Heavy Heritage,” CERMAM Profile, accessed March 
16, 2015, http://www.cermam.org/en/logs/portrait/abdul_aziz_alhakim_a_heavy_her_1/. 




As the new Iraqi government developed, Iran’s influence and power in Iraq 
continued to grow. Later, in the 2005 elections, the Shia political bloc United Iraqi 
Alliance took majority control over the newly formed government. Similar to Hakim, 
other SCIRI members were appointed to key cabinet positions throughout the war. Bayan 
Jabr served as the Minister of the Interior, Finance Minister, and Minister for 
Reconstruction and Housing. Perhaps one of the more extreme Shia hardliners, his tenure 
as Minister of the Interior was marked by recurring allegations of sectarian abuses and 
accusations of his turning the National Police into Shia death squads. One report even 
noted that the ministry’s guards had beards shaved in the Iranian style.137 Toward the end 
of U.S. involvement in Iraq, Iranian influence was used politically to ensure a Shia 
majority and hasten the United States’ departure. In late 2010, Iranian Quds Force 
Commander General Qassem Suleimani negotiated directly with the Iraqi senior cabinet 
and other power brokers within the Iraqi government and essentially directed the course 
of Iraq’s political direction for the next five years.138 Maliki remained in office as prime 
minister, and the Americans were asked to leave in 2011.139  Although Iranian influence 
did not totally dominate the coalition of Shia parties, its long-standing ties with the 
leaders of the country assured Iran of its ability to continue influencing Iraq’s senior 
policy makers. 
At the same time, Iran also employed Shia political parties and their armed wings 
to disrupt U.S. political influence and control within the country. Iran’s approach was 
twofold: it supported the integration of Badr militia forces into the Iraqi Ministry of the 
Interior, and trained, advised, and equipped other Shia militias to attack U.S. forces 
independently.140 By having a proxy group control the Ministry of Interior, Iran sought to 
pressure the U.S. into leaving Iraq by inflicting heavy U.S. military casualties and 
position itself to retaliate against the U.S. as needed in order to improve its bargaining 
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leverage regarding negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program.141 By empowering the Shia 
militias, Iran sought to replicate its success in Lebanon by countering U.S. influence in 
the region and preventing Iraq from becoming politically independent.142 After the SCIRI 
took control of the government and appointed Jabr as Minister of the Interior, Jabr 
appointed several loyal Badr Brigade officials as key officers within the ministry.143  
These senior officials integrated Badr Brigade elements into the ministry’s security forces 
as police commandos —newly appointed security forces who were later accused of 
conducting sectarian killings against Iraqi Sunnis, although these accusations were 
denied.144 Furthermore, Badr officials were selected by Iran to work openly with the 
U.S., which gained the organization access to intelligence shared by U.S. forces and 
allowed them to pass along early warnings, enabling the militias to avoid U.S. 
targeting.145 The continuing acts of violence and sectarianism served to increase 
uncertainty in Iraq and provided Iran the freedom to more directly influence daily events.   
In addition to Iran’s indirect support through the SCIRI, Iran also directly 
supported those Shia militias who conducted direct attacks against U.S. forces. Iran 
recognized that the Sadr Movement’s Jaysh al-Mahdi militia (JAM) was a potent force on 
the battlefield and began to provide it weapons and training in 2005.146  However, JAM’s 
ability to attack U.S. forces waned in 2008 when the group suffered setbacks at the hands 
of U.S. and Iraqi security forces amidst a political split from Prime Minister al-Maliki. 
The reduction of political clout forced al-Sadr to de-escalate his aggression towards the 
U.S., and he subsequently disbanded much of his militia to focus on politics.147  Instead 
of lowering Iran’s overall capability to employ violence against the U.S., the 
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disengagement of Sadr’s militia merely fractured the group into several hard-core groups 
that remained committed to Iran’s strategy.148 These militias, dubbed by the U.S. as 
Iranian “Special Groups,” continued to attack U.S. forces and represented a more 
singularly focused version of proxy forces than the earlier Sadrist militia. The main 
groups, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH), and the Sadrist Promised 
Day Brigades (PDB), received specialized training from Iranian operatives and Lebanese 
Hezbollah agents, as well as specialized munitions like the explosively-formed penetrator 
IED.149 Iran’s proxy forces became a more capable and sophisticated tool for Iran to 
destabilize Iraqi politics. In addition to IEDs, Special Groups elements were capable 
launching artillery and rocket attacks against U.S. forces; they also developed a discrete 
assassination capability to target select Iraqis in order to control politics.150 
While not able to be consistently analyzed through the lens of the political process 
model, Iran’s 30-year campaign to subordinate Iraq can be viewed as primarily a political 
struggle that features many characteristics of a social insurgency. The original Shia Iraqi 
opposition groups Da’wa and the SCIRI focused on attacking the Hussein regime, and 
also spent considerable effort mobilizing political support for themselves in preparation 
for an eventual return to Iraq. Through the establishment of organizations such as the 
Joint Action Committee (JAC), first established in Damascus in 1990, the Da’wa Party 
and SCIRI with other oppositional groups met to coordinate efforts against the Saddam 
Hussein regime at numerous conferences in 1990 and 1991 to discuss plans to topple 
Hussein’s government and even explored the possibility of forming a government-in-
exile.151 Iran, on the other hand, held larger regional ambitions, and sought to bring about 
political change following the Iranian Revolution by calling for Islamist revolutions 
throughout the Middle East, particularly in Iraq. Iran took advantage of the crisis 
precipitated by the U.S. invasion in 2003 to send in the already-mobilized Da’wa and 
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SCIRI parties, who were by this time mature from 20 years of conflict against the 
Ba’athists and were able to take advantage of a more permissive political environment. 
Even Sunni groups like the Kurdish Democratic Party and Patriotic Kurdish Union have 
had long-standing ties to Iran originating from the Iran-Iraq War.152 Iranian support in 
Iraq appears to be paramount. Other groups like Ahmed Chalabi’s Iraqi National 
Congress, who were primarily tied to the U.S., proved unable to retain power for an 
extended amount of time.  
Similar to Iran’s earlier co-optation of Shia opposition groups to fight against the 
Hussein regime, Iran sought to leverage the Shia indigenous organizations’ members, 
incentives, communications structure, and leadership to influence the Iraqi government 
and increase Iran’s overall influence throughout the Middle East region. The long-
standing relationship developed between Iran’s Quds Force and its sponsored proxy 
forces has directly enabled Iran to increase its influence throughout the Iraqi government. 
Iran took advantage of the years following the Iran-Iraq War to expand its sponsored 
groups from the early Islamist opposition groups al-Da’wa and the SCIRI, to Hezbollah 
(which operated as trainers in Iraq), the Badr Brigades, the Mahdi Army, and numerous 
other cells organized for special attacks and political influence. 
Iran made extensive use of these Shia militia groups to recruit fighters to stage 
attacks against the U.S. Planning for efforts to counter the U.S. began before the U.S. 
invasion of Iraq as early as 2002, with the Supreme Leader Khamenei instructing his 
senior advisors to “adopt an active policy in order to prevent long-term and short-term 
dangers to Iran.”153 With this guidance, Iranian intelligence services and the Quds Force 
began to organize its sponsored groups to prepare to re-enter Iraq.154 After the downfall 
of the Hussein government, some 12,000 members of the Badr Brigades moved into Iraq 
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and immediately attempted to seize control of certain areas in south and east Iraq.155 
Accompanying the Badr Brigades were Iranian agents. In addition to gaining intelligence 
on the forces and political dealings, these agents were tasked with reaching out to former 
regime officials and soldiers to recruit them into working for Iran against the U.S.156 Iran 
did not limit its agents and sponsored militias to solely recruit single members, however. 
It engaged in wholesale bloc recruitment as well, sending Hezbollah agents to establish 
relations with Moqtada al-Sadr to recruit members and train his militia to conduct attacks 
against the U.S. as well; by 2003 Hezbollah trainers had established a cell within the 
Mahdi Army and in 2004, elements of the Mahdi Army began conducting ambush attacks 
against coalition forces with Iranian support.157 
The adoption of the incentives structure allowed Iran to maintain and grow its 
network of opposition groups in the event of a crisis in Iraq. Through its narrative of 
Islamic Revolution and opposition to secular and westernized government, it has 
successfully co-opted the incentive structure of various Shia oppositional groups 
throughout the Middle East. For example, Hezbollah, critical to the training of Iraqi Shia 
militias following the U.S.-Iraq War and considered to be the most developed Iranian-
sponsored organization, began as a response to the Israeli incursion into Lebanon in 
1983.158 In the years during the Iran-Iraq War and in its aftermath, Iran provided refuge 
to many Iraqi Shia fleeing the violence and retaliation conducted by the Hussein 
Regime.159 This provided Iran the opportunity to monopolize oppositional groups’ 
attitudes and objectives. The clearest example of Iranian influence of incentives, 
however, is the SCIRI. This group’s ideology is precisely in line with Iran’s; it prefers an 
Islamic government ruled by clerics and answerable to a supreme ayatollah. Through its 
history, the SCIRI has repeatedly shown its preference for Iran. During the 1991 Shia 
uprising in southern Iraq, Badr Brigade and SCIRI forces rose against government forces, 
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carrying banners of SCIRI’s founder al-Hakim as well as Ayatollah Khomeini.160 In 
contrast, al-Da’wa’s ideology calls for the formation of an Islamic government, but one 
governed by elected officials. 
Critical to the recruitment of members and co-option of solidary incentives was 
Iran’s leveraging of the system of communications resident within the various Shia 
groups and the larger Shia community. The use of fatwas issued by religious authorities 
is perhaps one of the best examples of this. The use of fatwas is certainly not a new 
phenomenon; during the 1991 Iraqi Shia Uprising, rebels convinced Grand Ayatollah 
Sayyid Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei, Iraq’s leading Shia authority, to issue two fatwas calling 
for people to rise against the government, which helped the rebels gain popular 
support.161 Later, in 2008 Da’wa activist and religious authority Grand Ayatollah Sayyid 
Kadhim al-Husseini al-Haeri issued a fatwa against a pending security agreement 
between the Iraqi government and the U.S.162 While it was limited in its effect due to 
Haeri’s not being a pre-eminent Iraqi scholar, the fatwa’s reach was almost certainly 
significant as a strategic communications tool. Fatwas have the same authority as court 
rulings for Muslims, and while the choice to observe a fatwa can be more voluntary than 
other legal rulings, the credibility of fatwas and the support that they can engender can 
have a galvanizing effect within a Muslim community. The timing of Haeri’s fatwa 
indicates the politics behind it; in the aftermath of the U.S.-Iraq War, Shia Ayatollahs in 
Iran refrained from any such rulings when Shia political groups needed U.S. support to 
reform the Iraqi government.163 However, after the situation changed and Sunni 
insurgents were on the decline, Iran may have felt that it was appropriate to increase the 
pressure on the Iraqi government to break ties with the U.S. By couching its message in 
terms of a religious ruling, Iran ensured it would be widely broadcast and carry 
substantial credibility. 
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The clearest evidence of Iran’s influence in post-war Iraqi politics was the large 
number of former agents who were appointed to political positions and acted with 
impunity against the U.S. until its withdrawal in 2011. In addition to the above-
mentioned politicians such as Maliki, Hakim, Jabr, and Sadr, Iran assisted and supported 
numerous other figures to become battlefield commanders or prominent politicians. This 
allowed Iran to support the formation, training, and equipping of armed groups, and gave 
Quds Force commander Suleimani access to the highest levels of Iraqi government to 
direct the flow of events within the country. The most prominent battlefield commanders 
during the period following the downfall of the Hussein regime were Abu Mahdi al-
Muhandis and Hadi al-Ameri. These two were long-time operatives who began working 
for Iran during the Iran-Iraq War and rose to become powerful militia leaders and 
representatives of Iran in post-war Iraq. Both were commanders of the Badr Corps. 
Muhandis led the Badr Corps in 1985 while Ameri started as a battalion commander in 
1982 and later took over the Corps in the early 1990s.164 Muhandis, however, got his 
start as a Da’wa Party agent who was tried and convicted in absentia for attacking the 
French and U.S. embassies in Kuwait, as well as the attempted assassination of the 
Kuwaiti Emir in the early 1980s.165 In the aftermath of the U.S. invasion, these two 
commanders entered Iraq and took leading roles in the effort against the United States. 
Muhandis served mainly as a military commander, but he was known for his close 
relationship as a personal advisor to Suleimani and an organizer of opposition fighter 
groups.166  His main role was as a catalyst in the formation of new militant groups; he 
was charged with the formation of the Jaysh al-Mahdi’s “Special Groups,” consisting of 
AAH and KH. Muhandis was responsible for the training (done in cooperation with 
Lebanese Hezbollah advisors), equipping, funding, and employment of these groups to 
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conduct specialized attacks against U.S. and Coalition Forces.167 After the creation of 
these groups, Muhandis personally led KH, as well as facilitated the logistical support to 
other groups, enabling them to use Iranian-made roadside bombs, sniper weapons, anti-
aircraft missiles, and to employ infantry tactics, drastically improving the lethality and 
efficacy of the attacks against coalition forces.168 
Similarly, Hadi al-Ameri used his position as a long-time SCIRI leader to return 
to Iraq and guide his organization in support of Iranian objectives. In contrast to KH, 
which chose not to work with the new Iraqi government, the Badr Organization was 
selected by Iran to work openly within the government,169 and as Badr members 
established local control of Shiite areas, they developed good relations with the coalition 
forces in order to begin gathering intelligence on them.170 Later, Badr Organization 
members flooded Iraqi security organizations and received appointments as cabinet-level 
ministers and elected officials. For example, Hadi al-Ameri was appointed as 
Transportation Minister, and was later accused of murdering Iraqi Sunnis in targeted 
violence, using his position to enrich his relatives, and giving key offices to Badr 
members.171 Similarly, after Bayan Jabr was awarded the post of Interior Minister in 
2005, he gave key appointments to Badr members and enrolled lower-level Badr fighters 
as police, creating the Special Police force and legitimizing the Badr Organization’s 
militant forces.172  
These examples illustrate the dual approach of Iran’s primary agents: Muhandis 
worked from a military perspective, employing specialized cells who had received 
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military training and equipment to launch ambush attacks against coalition and especially 
American forces; and Ameri, whose Badr organization took advantage of the power 
vacuum in the political landscape, took over entire ministries and filled them with loyal 
members to enrich the organization and legitimize its efforts to engage in sectarian 
violence and disrupt U.S. efforts at creating a democratic state. These two leaders, their 
lieutenants, and especially their senior commander General Qassem Soleimani of the 
IRGC enacted a comprehensive strategy to extend Iranian influence while at the same 
time disrupt any possible western influence. 
3. 2013 to Present Day: Daesh and Iran’s Regional Strategy 
Since the withdrawal of the U.S. military Iran’s strategy has focused on 
consolidating its gains made during the 2003—2011 U.S. occupation, and providing 
support to the Iraqi government in the face of the Daesh threat. This has been a multi-
faceted strategy, ranging from financial investment, construction of religious tourism 
infrastructure, and commercial exports to the appointment of sponsored agents to 
office.173 Most importantly, Iran used the vacuum left by the U.S. to assert its influence 
in Iraq starting with its support to Prime Minister Maliki. Many politicians in Iraq such as 
Maliki (who had been selected by Soleimani as the preferred candidate to take the post of 
prime minister during the 2010 elections) viewed the U.S. withdrawal as a reduction in 
political support, and turned to Iran.174 Maliki reversed the earlier trend of reconciliation 
by attacking rival Sunni-dominated parties, appointing Iranian-backed agents like Hadi 
al-Ameri and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis to key cabinet positions, and purging the officer 
ranks of the Army of Sunni Arab and Kurdish officers and replacing them with officers 
loyal to himself, and ordering the arrests of his vice-president, Tariq al-Hashemi, and 
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Minister of Finance Rafa al-Essawi.175 Unfortunately, this antagonism of Sunni groups 
led to the unforeseen consequences by facilitating the emergence of Daesh. 
The persecution of Sunnis gave rise to massive demonstrations beginning in 
December of 2012, whose subsequent crackdown by the Maliki government created the 
conditions under which Daesh could seize the initiative. Following the threats to arrest 
Minister of Finance al-Essawi, large protests broke out across Iraq.176 Various Sunni 
political parties such as Mutahidun largely managed the protests, although the JRTN 
militia, a neo-Ba’athist group led by Saddam Hussein’s former deputy, organized other 
protest sites.177 Maliki’s response varied between harsh and conciliatory throughout the 
first three months of the demonstrations, but in April 2013 the protest movement was 
pushed towards militarization after a raid by national SWAT forces killed over 40 
unarmed protesters at the demonstration site at Huwija near Kirkuk.178 While this 
exacerbated the tensions between Maliki and the Sunni movements, negotiations between 
the Maliki government and newly elected officials continued over the course of 2013 
seeking an end to the standoff.179 However, instead of trying to bring the movement to 
demand peacefully, Maliki chose instead to declare martial law in Ramadi, cutting off 
travel and cell phone access, declared that the Ramadi protest site was an al-Qaeda 
headquarters, and sent security forces to destroy the camp.180 This prompted Sunni 
leaders in parliament to state that unless martial law was lifted, they would withdraw 
from government; Maliki acceded to their demands, lifted the siege of Ramadi, and 
withdrew the Army units surrounding the city.181 Instead of ameliorating tensions, the 
sudden withdrawal precipitated a complete collapse of security. Local police in Fallujah 
and Ramadi chose not to stand against al-Qaeda while being threatened by the Army, and 
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when the Army withdrew al-Qaeda elements (later referred to as ISIS, or Daesh) 
immediately moved to take over Fallujah.182 
With a new insurgency in full swing by 2014, Iran moved quickly to support the 
Maliki government. Iran’s first move was to send Soleimani with his Quds Force 
battalions to Iraq, where he immediately began planning with senior Iraqi leadership to 
counterattack Daesh elements that had taken over key cities.183 Soleimani was able to 
accomplish this quickly by bringing together militias Iran had sponsored for decades led 
by Hadi al-Ameri and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, as well as others such as Qais al-Khazali 
of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq to counterattack the rapidly advancing enemy.184 Iran was aided in 
mobilizing Shia militias by Maliki as well as Ayatollah al-Sistani, who both issued calls 
for Iraqis to join the Iraqi Security Forces during sermons.185 Maliki then took this 
opportunity to deputize the existing Shia militias in Iraq by forming the Popular 
Mobilization Committee, headed by his national security advisor Falih al-Fayyadh, yet 
commanded operationally by Muhandis.186 This allowed for the redeployment of 
thousands of fighters from Syria, where Iranian-sponsored militias had been supporting 
the Assad regime’s fight against oppositional forces, to Iraq. Since then, militia groups 
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under IRGC direction and guidance have fought alongside Iraqi Army and special 
operations forces as a major component of the overall Iraqi campaign to defeat Daesh, 
and have seen action at such battles at Amerli, Jurf al-Sakher, and Tikrit.  
The formation of the Popular Mobilization Committee can be thought of as the 
culmination of thirty years of Iranian sponsorship. To have these units recognized as a 
legitimate Iraqi force, with their corresponding political parties, represents a major 
victory of Iranian foreign policy. Ostensibly, Iran is using its patronage of various Shia 
militias to combat the terrorist organization. This patronage is part of Iranian strategy to 
wield regional power through non-state actors. Also prevalent, although perhaps less 
visible, is the growth of Iran’s political influence within the Iraqi government, which is 
once again leveraging the crisis of the Baghdad government as a means to increase its 
sway. McAdam notes that regime crises increase the political opportunities for both 
members and non-members of the polity of a country.187 General political instability not 
only undermines the advantage of the incumbent, but also encourages collective action by 
organized groups.188 As Shia militia groups’ increased mobilization leads to an improved 
bargaining position vis-à-vis the Iraqi government, the chances of the Iraqi government 
being able to control or repress these groups lessens because the government is either 
unable to attack or unwilling to expose itself to any political backlash.189 Iran is then able 
to leverage this dynamic as an opportunity to cement a position for itself through its 
sponsored movement organizations and militias and increase its political power within 
Iraq while at the same time ensuring that Iraq is increasingly dependent on its aid for 
survival.190   
C. CONCLUSION 
In sum, Iran’s persistent sponsorship of opposition movements in Iraqi society 
and national politics has been a major factor in its to-date successful strategy to gain 
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influence. Iran’s shared Shia identity with Shia Iraqis allowed it to further its goals 
through bloc recruitment of various Shia organizations and recruit new members through 
trusted channels. Iran has reportedly spent millions of dollars developing holy sites in 
Najaf, Karbala, Kadhimiya and Samarra, sites that are visited by multitudes of Shia 
pilgrims every year. In addition, Iran also sends clerics trained in Qom with Islamist 
ideologies to Iraq, where they presumably compete with local religious authorities for 
prominence. These clerics are vital in recruiting new members to their Islamist ideologies 
and were quite likely aided by widespread anti-U.S. sentiment prevalent in the later 
2000s. With Iran’s heavy investment in the military (through its militias), police, 
religious, and commercial pillars of support, it has ensured that many members of Iraqi 
society readily identify with Iranian goals.191 
The Iran-Iraq War and the U.S.-Iraq War of 2003 illustrate two time periods with 
similar circumstances where Iran successfully co-opted the Iraqi Shia social movement to 
expand its influence. The upheaval caused by war created unique political opportunities 
for Da’wa and the SCIRI, which Iran made use of by providing political sponsorship and 
material support that enabled the two parties to take power in Iraq. Iran helped to change 
the structure of political opportunities in each war by mobilizing the parties’ 
organizational resources and mentoring and directing each movement’s organizational 
leadership, and has been assisting these groups in recruiting new members within Iraq. In 
return, Iran was given free rein to influence the Iraqi political hierarchy and shape policy 
decisions. Additionally, it gained the freedom to maneuver proxy forces against the U.S. 
to limit its influence in Iraq and the greater Middle East, and punish the Americans for 
any setbacks to their nuclear program negotiations, ultimately gaining an important 
victory in 2011 by forcing the withdrawal of American forces. Perhaps ironically Iran 
was aided in this by the U.S., whose strategic goal of establishing democracy in Iraq 
enabled Shi’a political groups to take power. 
Iran’s actions to establish its dominance in Iraqi affairs—even before the 
beginning of the Iran-Iraq War—give context to how Iran was able to insert itself so 
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quickly into the fight against Daesh in June of 2014; these actions also shed light on the 
challenges facing the U.S. as it attempts to regain lost influence in Iraq. Iran’s strategy 
has resulted in its influence permeating many aspects of today’s Iraqi government. To 
counter this requires an equally long-term strategic outlook and approach. 
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IV. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS OF THE IRAQI DEFENSE 
NETWORK 
To accurately focus efforts to counter Iranian influence throughout the Iraqi 
Defense Network, the network must be mapped, and its structure and power centers 
analyzed. This chapter uses social network analysis to visualize the various groups 
fighting against Daesh and where brokerage occurs at the tactical levels between these 
groups. This is important to understand because the mechanisms of Iran’s influence 
strategy are most clearly visible at the tactical level; by recruiting militia groups to fight 
under their sponsored militia groups, IRGC commanders increase both their combat and 
political power to affect the course of events in Iraq. However, the overall strategic 
impact of the tactical level mechanisms is rarely analyzed, let alone understood.  
Understanding the network structure of the IDN helps to answer one of the 
primary research questions: What is the strategic nature and extent of Iranian influence in 
Iraq? Analysis of the network also yields answers to several underlying questions—who 
are the brokers within the network? Where does brokerage occur for pro-Iranian actors 
and groups? What is the mechanism of brokerage? Moreover, how are each of the sub-
groups connected to Iranian influence? Developing a thorough understanding of this will 
assist in determining courses of action to counter Iran’s powerful sway over the network. 
A. DATA AND METHODS 
The network data have been drawn from a combination of classified and open 
source media.192 To define a starting point for coding the network, information on top 
officials involved in the fight against Daesh was collected from open sources such as 
Wikipedia pages, news reports, journal articles, twitter feeds and Facebook profiles. 
Due to the size and complexity of the data involved, I initially imposed nominalist 
boundaries in order to simplify data collection and gain insight into the network, however 
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as new information was discovered the boundaries became realistic in nature.193 I 
identified actors who hold a position in an Iraqi Security Forces unit such as the Iraqi 
Special Operations Forces or a recognized militia such as the Badr Organization or 
Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq,194 and added actors outside of the Iraqi Army and Ministry of 
Defense who significantly influence overall security planning and the conduct of 
operations within Iraq. These actors include foreign officials such as IRGC Commander 
General Qassem Soleimani, politicians such as the Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi 
and Minister of the Interior Mohammed al-Ghabban, who is a member of the Badr 
Organization. Militia commanders such as Hadi al-Ameri of the Badr Organization and 
Qais al-Khaz’ali of AAH lead semi-legitimate forces against Daesh on behalf of the Iraqi 
government and in close coordination with Iraqi Army forces. 
After conducting the initial research into the organization, analysis revealed 
several types of ties that were important for understanding Iranian influence. It became 
apparent that ties such as communications and colleague networks, and shared 
organizational affiliation ties among the actors in the network were relevant to 
understanding brokerage within the network. As more information on the network was 
collected, it became clear that the ISF was not the only player on the battlefield. In 
particular, the central role of Shia militia leaders, which likely resulted from Iraq’s Shia 
government mobilizing additional forces to combat the Daesh threat, became clear.195 
The resulting network consisted of 120 individuals, 88 organizations, and five events. It 
is presented in Figure 1 in which individuals are represented by red nodes, and 
organizations and events by green nodes. 
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Figure 1.  IDN, Two-mode Network Visualization 
 
 
Iranian influence is captured from this network using the aggregation of several 
relational ties depicting the various forms that this influence has taken, using a ties 
developed in a team project codebook.196 In addition, the network was further 
categorized in terms of the broad interest they represent: Iranian agents (yellow), Iraqi 
political actors (red), Iraqi Security Forces (green), Sunni tribes and militias (blue), or 
Shia militias (purple).197 While the ties mainly reflect personal influence, they also 
capture conduits for the mobilization of resources and other types of support.198 The ties 
show how Iranian agents have become embedded within the network and have 
established themselves as top-level brokers. Closer study shows where brokerage allows 
for new groups to join with those close to Iranian power.  
In order to analyze the network with basic social network analysis metrics and 
algorithms, it is first necessary to transform the two-mode organizational and event 
                                                 
196 Ties were defined using a team project codebook develop by Dan Cunningham, Associate 
Professor, DA Department, and are shown in Appendix 1. While the codebook defined 20 relational ties, 
only ties relevant to the network were considered. 
197 The affiliation attribute categories give a rough approximation of the major sub-groups of the 
network, and help to demonstrate overlap and brokerage. 





affiliation networks into a series of one-mode networks.199 This was unnecessary for the 
colleagues and communication networks since they were already one-mode networks. 
Such a transformation generally assumes that two actors share a tie if they are affiliated 
with the same organization or participated in the same event. Here, this is probably an 
unreasonable assumption and, in fact, leads to an overly dense network. Thus, only ties of 
strength two or more (i.e., when two actors shared two or more organizational or event 
affiliations) were retained. That is, ties with a strength of less than or equal to one were 
removed from the network. In the end, we were left with two sets of networks, the 
communication and colleagues network and the shared organizational and event network. 
They are presented in Figures 2 and 3, respectively. 
Figure 2.  Communications and Colleagues Network by Major Subgroup 
 
  
                                                 
199 A one-mode network consists of a single set of actors (e.g., individuals) and the ties between them. 
A two-mode network consists of two sets of actors (e.g., individuals and organizations) in which the ties 
are between the two types of actors (e.g., between individuals and organizations) but not within a set of 








Figure 3.  Shared Organizational and Event Network by Major Subgroup 
 (Tie Strength Greater Than One) 
 
 
B. NETWORK OVERVIEW 
The IDN consists of groups, organizations, and individuals who are engaged 
against Daesh in Iraq and includes individuals from the Iraqi Special Operations Forces, 
SOCCENT’s main partner, other elements of the Iraqi Security Forces, political 
establishment, religious authorities, tribal and militia groups, and external agents from 
Iran. The actors in the network are members of numerous sectors and levels of Iraqi 
society but can be broadly grouped into Iraqi Security Forces, Sunni militias (including 
Kurdish and western Al-Anbar tribes), Shia militias, and political actors. Each of these 
subgroups works loosely with the other to defeat ISIS elements on the battlefield and 
bring stability to Iraq, with the exception of the Shia militias that are heavily influenced 
and largely controlled by Iran’s Quds Force. 
Iran exercises its influence mainly through the sponsorship of militias and 
political parties (who grew out of their original militia and opposition group forms to join 
the political process in Iraq in the post-Saddam period of 2003–2011). This sponsorship 
is one of three main avenues of Iranian influence exercised throughout Iraq; the other two 
being the promotion of Iranian religious influence throughout the Shi’a establishment and 
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Iran’s positioning itself to act as a political arbiter to settle disputes.200 Iranian 
representatives, such as General Qassem Soleimani, and Shia militia leaders Hadi al-
Ameri and Abdul Mahdi al-Muhandis are embedded firmly within the center of the 
network, shown in Figure 4. This reflects their involvement in the popular mobilization 
units, Hashed al-Shaabi. Also prominent are political leaders such as the National 
Security adviser, Falih al-Fayyadh (titular head of the Hashed), and Supreme Islamic 
Iraqi Council leader Ammar al-Hakim, whose organization was the forerunner and 
sponsor of many of the Shia militias fighting in Iraq today. 
Figure 4.  Communications and Colleagues Network 
 
 
1. Major Subgroup Affiliations  
While Iranian influence is pervasive throughout the IDN, it is by no means 
uniform. Each of the major affiliation subgroups in the IDN is affected by Iranian 
influence in different ways, based on their relationship with the major Iranian actors. The 
political actor subgroup consists of members of the Iraqi national parliament, senior 
                                                 
200 Alireza Nader, “Iran’s Role in Iraq: Room for U.S.-Iran Cooperation?,” Perspective: Expert 








 Ammar al-Hakim 
 Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis 
 Gen. Qassem Soleimani 
 Hadi al-Ameri 
 Falih al-Fayyadh 
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cabinet officials, and other governmental figures like provincial governors and local 
politicians. This group has struggled to assert control over the other subgroups and is 
subject to pressure not only from the U.S. military and IRGC groups (in the prosecution 
of the fight against Daesh) but also from the Shia and Sunni militia. The Iraqi 
government controls the ISF most tightly with formally established lines of authority as 
well as financial and equipment resources, yet it is unable to ensure that the ISF has the 
necessary resources and leadership to prevent major losses. This became apparent in the 
loss of Mosul in 2014, where an entire operational command and city police forces 
crumbled in front of an advance of only 800 fighters.201 
Within this group Nouri al-Maliki, Hadi al-Ameri, and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis 
are notable for their overlapping membership between Iranian and Iraqi political interests. 
These actors have a long history with Iran and are heavily involved in the fight against 
ISIS. They are long time operatives of groups sponsored by Iran, and have conducted and 
coordinated strike operations against Ba’ath Party forces during the Iran-Iraq War as well 
as against U.S. forces following the US-Iraq war of 2003 (in the case of al-Muhandis). 
During the period after the fall of the Hussein government, they each have held cabinet 
positions and currently hold senior leadership positions in their respective political 
parties. Opposite from the Iranian-influenced politicians and cabinet members are actors 
such Ayad Allawi, Ahmed Chalabi (although recently deceased),202 and Massoud 
Barzani, who have historically been pro-U.S. in their stances and political dealings. It 
cannot be said, however, that these politicians have zero tolerance for Iran. In the 1980s, 
Barzani’s KDP militias fought alongside Iran against the Baa’th Party. 
                                                 
201 Ned Parker, Isabel Coles, and Raheem Salman, “How Mosul Fell: An Iraqi General Disputes 
Baghdad’s Story,” Reuters, October 14, 2014, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/10/14/uk-mideast-crisis-
gharawi-special-report-idUKKCN0I30ZA20141014; Martin Chulov in Beirut, Fazel Hawramy in Irbil, and 
Spencer Ackerman in New York, “Iraq Army Capitulates to Isis Militants in Four Cities,” The Guardian, 
June 11, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/11/mosul-isis-gunmen-middle-east-states. 
202 Although considered as pro-American, Chalabi is a controversial figure who has been discredited 
for providing false intelligence and is seen by some as an Iranian agent in Iraq. See Dexter Filkins, “Where 
Plan A Left Ahmad Chalabi,” New York Times, November 5, 2006, sec. Magazine, 9–10, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/05/magazine/05CHALABI.html; Michael Eisenstadt, Michael Knights, 
and Ahmed Ali, “Iran’s Influence in Iraq: Countering Tehran’s Whole-of-Government Approach,” Policy 
Focus (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2011), 23, 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus111.pdf. 
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The Sunni Militia subgroup is composed of Sunni Arab tribal groups fighting 
Daesh.203 It is led by figures such as Sheikhs Ahmed Abu Risha and Ali Hatem Ab’d al-
Razzaq Ali al-Dulaimi. Many of these tribes are attempting to mobilize government-
sanctioned tribal defense forces under the popular mobilization program.204 Since gaining 
the initial agreement, however, the effort has largely stalled due to mistrust between 
members of the Shiite-dominated central government and the tribal militias. Despite the 
political headwinds, some Anbar tribal militias have fought in the battles to defend 
Ramadi, and central Iraqi Sunni militias participated in the liberation of Tikrit. Fearing 
exclusion from the central government on one side and retribution from Daesh on the 
other, Anbari militia leaders have used this situation as an opportunity to gain 
concessions of greater autonomy from the central government, and equipment for their 
fighters.205  
The ISF subgroup consists of actors in the Iraqi Army, the Special Operations 
Forces (a separate organization from the Army), and the Iraqi Police. The U.S. military, 
the Iraqi Army, and Iraqi SOF all have strong ties with each other, while the National 
Police are closer to the IRGC. This influence is represented at the top level by Minister of 
the Interior Mohammed Salem al-Ghabban, who is a senior official within the Badr 
Organization’s political wing and maintains trust and loyalty ties to Hadi al-Ameri.206 
The ISF’s disastrous performance has put the central government in a precarious 
situation; it is unable to take decisive action without relying on groups it does not have 
                                                 
203 While the Kurds are another major Sunni force fighting against Daesh, the study of Iranian 
influence within Kurdish groups is outside the scope of this thesis. For more information on Kurdish social 
networks, see Christopher M. Couch, “Aghas, Sheiks, and Daesh in Iraq: Kurdish Robust Action in 
Turmoil” (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015), 
http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/45831/15Jun_Couch_Christopher.pdf?sequence=1. 
204 Hamza Mustafa, “Abadi Agrees to Anbar Anti-ISIS Volunteer Force,” Asharq Al-Awsat, October 
28, 2014, http://www.aawsat.net/2014/10/article55337984/iraq-abadi-agrees-to-anbar-anti-isis-volunteer-
force. 
205 Ariel I. Ahram, “Harnessing Militia Power: Lessons of the Iraqi National Guard,” The Brookings 
Institution, accessed June 14, 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/05/27-militias-
iraq-national-guard. 
206 Loveday Morris, “Appointment of Iraq’s New Interior Minister Opens Door to Militia and Iranian 




sufficient control over, and is effectively mortgaging the state monopoly on the use of 
force to defeat Daesh. 
Shia militias arguably constitute the most powerful subgroup within the network. 
This subgroup consists of militia leaders and other actors such as the senior leaders of 
Ahl Asa’ib al-Haq (AAH), Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH), Badr Brigades, Promise Day 
Brigades (PDB), and Kata’ib al-Imam Ali (KIA). These militias have been active in Iraq 
and the greater Middle East since the 1980s (in the case of the Badr militias), and were 
recently employed against the U.S. and its allies following the downfall of the Ba’ath 
regime. This subgroup has numerous ties to the central government and the IRGC, and 
wields enough influence to pursue its own agenda. Ostensibly, actors in this subgroup are 
focused on military concerns, but their roles in the network indicate their larger goals. 
The Badr Corps, headed by Hadi al-Ameri and whose members claim 22 seats in the Iraqi 
Congress, makes no effort to hide its association with and loyalty to the IRGC and 
Iran.207 In addition to having an already well-established organization, Shia militias have 
benefitted greatly from political assistance by leading governmental figures. The move to 
formally deputize the existing Shia militias through the Popular Mobilization committee 
essentially elevated non-state groups to legitimate state actor status. Recognizing these 
groups’ effectiveness, the central government has given responsibility to coordinate 
operations Ameri, effectively subordinating the official Iraqi military and police forces to 
the militias, allowing Shia militias to then dictate the course of the fight.208 Ameri has 
partnered with both Iraqi Army and IRGC commanders to plan operations; operations 
now involving Shia militias have welcomed IRGC assistance while spurning U.S. 
military advisers.209 Iranian influence is most significant in this subgroup, due to the 
long-standing relationship between the IRGC and the individual militias. Abu Mahdi al-
Muhandis best typifies this influence. Widely considered to be Soleimani’s right-hand 
man in Iraq, Muhandis was Ameri’s commander in the Badr Brigades in the 1980s, has 
                                                 
207 Susannah George, “Breaking Badr,” Foreign Policy: Dispatch, November 6, 2014, 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/06/breaking-badr/. 
208 Ali and Kagan, “The Iraqi Shi’a Mobilization to Counter the ISIS Offensive.” 
209 Vivian Salama, “Iraq Militias Say They Don’t Need U.S. Help in Anbar Operation,” Yahoo News, 
June 12, 2015, http://news.yahoo.com/iraq-militias-dont-us-help-anbar-operation-184932908.html. 
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served openly as both a member of the Iraqi parliament (Da’wa Party) and a personal 
advisor to Soleimani.210 
The IRGC subgroup consists of the Iranian advisors in Iraq who are partnered 
with the various Shia militias fighting against Daesh. Led by General Qassem Soleimani, 
this group represents Iranian interests in the fight against Daesh. Although little is known 
about the group’s exact size, reports following Mosul’s downfall placed the number equal 
to two battalions, and recent reports have accused Iran of sending as many as 30,000 
operatives to Iraq.211 The IRGC has made good use of its extensive ties with the Shia 
militias and the central government. By virtue of its history of sponsorship of historic 
Iraqi oppositional parties, the IRGC has strong, personal relationships with several Iraqi 
national leaders such as the former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.212 The extent of 
Iranian reach throughout the Iraqi political and militias subgroups is clearly present. 
Figure 5 depicts the overlapping nature memberships between the major affiliate 
subgroups, and shows that Iran has at least one agent or an agent who is closely tied to 
each of these in the network. Mohammed Qureshi’s status as a member of both the 
Security Forces (as commander of the MOI unit the Wolf Brigade) and the Shia militia in 
Figure 3 is uncertain, however, since Daesh reportedly killed him last year.213 
  
                                                 
210 UPI, “Abu Mahdi and Iran’s Web in Iraq,” 
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2010/10/07/Abu-Mahdi-and-Irans-web-in-Iraq/52371286478366/. 
211 Farnaz Fassihi, “Iran Deploys Forces to Fight Al Qaeda-Inspired Militants in Iraq,” Wall Street 
Journal, June 13, 2014, sec. World, http://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-deploys-forces-to-fight-al-qaeda-
inspired-militants-in-iraq-iranian-security-sources-1402592470; Al Jazeera, “Iran Accused of Sending 
30,000 Troops to Fight in Iraq - Al Jazeera English,” Al Jazeera, March 23, 2015, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/03/iran-accused-sending-30000-troops-fight-iraq-
150322212917339.html. 
212 Filkins, “What We Left Behind.” 
213 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V4yWN8CxcTA; http://isisstudygroup.com/?p=1480  
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Figure 5.  Sunni Militia-Shia Militia-Political Actor Dual Membership. 
Agents With Ties to the Most Subgroups Are Enlarged. 
 
 
C. NETWORK TOPOGRAPHY 
Standard network topography measures for the IDN aggregated network are 
presented in Table 1. The communication and colleagues network’s diameter and average 
distance are 10.0 and 3.745, respectively, which are much “wider” than the diameter and 
average distance of the shared affiliation network (3.0 and 1.223),214 suggesting that the 
former network is somewhat more distributed than the latter. That said, the four sets of 
centralization and standard deviation measures indicate that the communication and 
colleagues network is more centralized than the shared affiliation network. Taken together 
they capture the fact that the communication and colleagues is more of a hub-and-spoke 
configuration, while the shared affiliation network consists of more distinctly separated 
clusters. The cohesion, average degree, clustering coefficient scores differ substantially 
between the two networks. In particular, they indicate that the shared affiliation network is far 
more connected than the communication and colleagues network. 
                                                 
214 A network’s diameter equals the longest shortest path (i.e., geodesic) between all pairs of 
connected actors in the network. Average distance equals the average path distance between all pairs of 
connected actors in the network. 
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Size 120 120 
Diameter 10.000 3.00 
Average Distance 3.745 1.223 
Cohesion 0.278 0.967 
Average Degree 2.975 90.367 
Clustering Coefficient 0.316 0.962 
Degree Centralization (in %) 17.95 17.73 
Std Dev 5.025 12.880 
Closeness Centralization  
(in %) 
202.62 36.31 
Std Dev 1.830 0.247 
Eigenvector Centralization  
(in %) 
37.40 2.37 




Std Dev 353.364 152.362 
 
1. Subgroup Analysis 
The aggregated network was analyzed to determine the number of distinct 
subgroups within by using k-cores, Newman groups, and clique membership. Subgroup 
analysis is useful for determining dense clusters of actors sharing ties who have strong 
relationships with one another.215 To better understand Iranian influence in the IDN, 
understanding how clusters of actors are formed and who is centrally or peripherally 
located among these subclusters within the IDN can help pinpoint nodes to target for 
removal, influence, or even monitoring in order to learn more about networks when one’s 
knowledge is incomplete.216 By combining the various measurements of clustering 
within the communications and colleagues and shared affiliation networks, a clearer 
picture begins to emerge regarding potential brokers of influence. 
                                                 
215 Everton, Dark Networks, 170. 
216 Ibid., 204–205. 
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K-core analysis was used to identify pathways of Iranian influence with a focus 
on seeing where peripheral actors were located.217 While k-core analysis did not reveal 
unknown pathways of Iranian influence, a possible pathway to increase U.S. influence 
was discovered. Figure 6 shows within the communications and colleagues network two 
areas that can be thought of as centers of influence within the network. The solid circle 
represents those actors who best represent Iranian influence, while the dashed circle can 
be thought of as those more open to U.S. influence. Both of these groups seek to 
influence mainly on the k-core subgroup that is colored orange, the central government 
officials. In order to begin counteracting Iranian influence from its center, the dashed 
circle can be viewed as one possible starting point from which the U.S. could begin to 
counter this influence through recruitment of known subordinates or associates of actors 
in the dashed circle group.  
  
                                                 
217 K-Cores examine group clustering by identifying groups where an actor is connected by some 
number (k) to other group members; actors in a 2-core have at least two or more ties to all the other actors 
in the 2-core, actors in a 3-core have at least three or more ties to all other actors in the 3-core, and so on. 
Moreover, higher k-cores are nested within lower ones, meaning all actors in a 3-core also belong to the 2 
and 1-cores. This suggests that actors located in lower k-cores are more peripherally located than are actors 
located in higher k-cores, and could be susceptible to recruitment by others. See Everton, Dark Networks, 
182. 
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Figure 6.  Communication and Colleagues Network, K-Core Analysis 
 
 
A second algorithm used to detect clustering, Newman groups, captured an 
interesting aspect of Iranian influence. Newman groups identify subgroups where the 
density of ties within groups is greater than that across groups.218 The algorithm 
partitioned the communication and colleagues network into eight subgroups with a 
modularity score of 0.5459, suggesting a moderately accurate grouping. Most notable 
was the breadth to which actors shared the same group as General Soleimani, noted in 
Figure 6. With this group showing more ties to each other than to the other subgroup, it is 
reflective of Soleimani’s wide influence among senior leaders, and also can be compared 
with the peripheral actors identified in Figure to understand who is more strongly 
connected to Soleimani. 
 
 
                                                 








Figure 7.  Communication and Colleagues Network, Node Color = Newman 




Clique membership provides an initial look into who among the network may be 
in a brokerage position. A clique in a network is a group where each actor has direct ties 
to every other actor in the group. Using clique analysis to identify subgroups is often 
problematic because it is often unreasonable to assume every actor of a subgroup is tied 
to all other actors in the group, and (2) actors can belong to multiple cliques.219 However, 
clique membership can be used as a proxy for brokerage, by identifying actors with 
membership in multiple cliques. Figure 8 presents a visualization using a combination of 
the two networks where actors are tied to various cliques.220 MG Fadhil al-Barwari and 
Ali al-Jubouri hold membership in multiple cliques, along with Sheikhs Hamden and al-
Goud, and are also on the periphery surround hardline Shia actors, suggesting that they 
might be candidates with whom to establish closer ties. 
                                                 
219 Ibid., 171. 
220 In this visualization, isolates and pendants (nodes with only a single tie) were removed to enhance 
clarity. 
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Figure 8.  Clique Membership  
 
 
a. Subgroup Analysis Discussion 
Of the various subgroup and clustering algorithms ran on the IDN, Newman 
groups, k-cores, and clique membership most clearly showed the pathways of Iranian 
influence within the network. What is interesting is the inclusion of some of the top 
political leadership in the militia-related clusters such as Iraqi PM Haider al-Abadi, KRG 
president Massoud Barzani, and ISCI leader Ammar al-Hakim. Although these three are 
prominent politicians, they are also the heads of their groups’ respective militias. As the 
Iraqi commander-in-chief, Abadi has become the de facto head of the deputized Shia and 
Sunni militias, while Hakim is the overall commander of several militias such as the 
Ashura Brigades,221 and Barzani is the leader of the Kurdish Peshmerga. 
D. NODE-LEVEL CENTRALITY 
Node-level centrality metrics to determine who is the most central, or important, 
within the network. These metrics take into account the notion that some nodes are 
structurally central to a network, and builds on this by utilizing concepts taken from 
                                                 









exchange theory that examine the nature of relationships in terms of the flow of 
information from one person to another to measure an actor’s power within a network.222 
The major centrality measures consider a node’s ties to other nodes (degree centrality), 
the number of ties to other central actors (eigenvector), how close each actor is to all 
other actors (closeness),223 and the degree to which each actor lies on the shortest path 
between other pairs of actors (betweenness). By identifying the most central actors in the 
network, we can then tailor a strategy to more fully explore all potential avenues of 
influence.224 Actor centrality scores were calculated for both the communication and 
colleague and the shared affiliation networks and the scores for the top 10 actors are 
presented in Tables 2 and 3.225 Since Iranian influence is depends largely on brokerage 
between actors and subgroups with the IDN, betweenness and eigenvector centrality 
visualizations are displayed below in Figures 9–14, where node size varies in terms of 
centrality. 
  
                                                 
222 Everton, Dark Networks, 206. 
223 Closeness was measured using average reciprocal distances, which takes into account disconnected 
networks. 
224 Everton, Dark Networks, 252. 
225 Centralities were visualized using ORA; however, the ranking of each actor in the network as 
computed using UCINET. As a result, some of the node sizing may appear to be different than the table 
suggests. The labeled nodes were shown using the rankings computed in ORA. 
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Table 2.   Communication and Colleagues Network Centrality Measures 
RANK DEGREE CLOSENESS BETWEENNESS EIGENVECTOR 
















3 Ibrahim al-Jaafari 
(15.000) 
Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis 
(6.436) 












5 Baha al-Araji 
(15.000) 




Adel Abdul Mahdi 
(35.993) 




Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis 
(9.093) 
Roj Nouri Shawis 
(35.993) 


















9 Qassem Mohammed al-
Fahdawi 
(14.000) 



















Table 3.   Table Shared Organizational and Event Affiliation Network 
Centrality Scores 
RANK DEGREE CLOSENESS  BETWEENNESS EIGENVECTOR 







Jubouri (34.328)  










3  Ali Dodah al-Jubouri 
(37.000) 






4 Ali Dodah al-Jubouri 
(72.000)  







5 Nawar Mohammed 
(37.000)  




Mohammed (LNU)  
(33.401) 






















Sheikh Khaled al-Jbara 
(3.438) 
Hadi al-Ameri  
(28.390) 








10 Talib Shegati al-Kenani 
(32.000) 
Gen. Qassem Soleimani 
(51.630) 















Fouad Massoum  
Ibrahim al-Jaafari 
Baha al-Araji 
Adel Abdul Mahdi 
Roj Nouri Shawis 
Mohammed Saleh al-Mutlaq 
Hoshyar al-Zebari 
Haidar Jassim Zamili 



















































a. Node-Level Centrality Analysis226 
The centrality scores presented in Tables 2 and 3 confirm earlier assumptions that 
the most central actors in the IDN are those most associated with Iran and the Shi’a 
militias. Looking at the visualizations in Figures 9–14, the most central nodes are located 
in the portion of the network where the Iraqi Political Actor affiliation subgroup merges 
and blends with the Shi’a and Sunni militia ones. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Haider al-
Abadi is the top central actor in the one-mode network, however he does not figure 
prominently in the two-mode network centralities. Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis appears in 
the top ten actors in both one- and two-mode networks, although he did not score as 
highly as he had in earlier iterations of the centrality computations. Two surprise actors in 
the rankings, however, are Fadhil al-Barwari and mayor Ali Dodah al-Jubouri. Barwari 
                                                 
226 In order to properly assess the shared affiliation and event network, actors whose aggregated ties 
skewed the network were removed to allow for a more realistic assessment. Actors Ayad Allawi and MG 
Qasim al-Mohammedi skewed the shared affiliation and event network’s centrality metrics due to their 
position directly in between the two major clusters after the minimum tie strength was raised to greater than 
1.0. Their removal allowed betweenness centrality to be more accurately measured; with the two still in the 
network they scored as being completely central while every other actor in the network was minimized. In 
addition, while computing eigenvector centrality for the shared affiliation and event network, the ISOF 
cluster of actors was removed due to their presence skewing the metrics, possibly due to the E-I index for 









took the top rankings in betweenness and closeness in both networks, despite being 
relatively outside the political actor and militia affiliation subgroups, reflective of his 
battlefield’s importance. Ali Dodah al-Jubouri appeared in the top ten rankings in every 
category of the shared affiliation network, yet is not a highly ranked politician or a militia 
commander. Mayor Jubouri’s village of al-Sharqat is an hour’s drive north of Tikrit, 
which was recently liberated, and has been fighting against Daesh since June of 2014.227 
Upon initial investigation it is possible that he has several ties to both the PMP forces as 
well as the Iraqi Security Forces, and works both as a local political leader and fights as 
part of militia forces. 
One issue was noted when visualizing eigenvector centrality. The structural 
positions within the ISOF brigades were skewing the overall eigenvector centrality scores 
and masking more realistic centrality measurements. This can possibly be attributed to an 
incomplete understanding of the IDN; it is likely that there are ties connecting the ISF 
subgroup (most likely on the Iraqi National Police side) to those with strong ties to Iran. 
We can trace this assumption to the Badr Organization’s decision to participate in the 
political process, which resulted in their being given the portfolio for Iraq’s security 
ministry in 2005.228 To remedy this, the ISOF cluster was hidden and eigenvector 
centrality was recalculated. The new calculation showed that eigenvector centrality was 
held in the main cluster by those considered within the Iranian sphere of influence, shown 
in Figure 14. Each of the top ten actors had a tie to some form of Iranian influence 
through its sponsorship of Shia militias. This is interesting because it somewhat 
accurately reflects the reach of Iranian influence in Iraq. In the political and militias the 
Iranian ties are strong, whereas they are not in the security forces (primarily the Iraqi 
Army).  
                                                 
227 Deborah Amos. “In Tikrit Offensive, Local Sunnis, Shiite Militias Are Unlikely Allies.” News. 
NPR Parallels, 19 MAR 15. http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/03/19/394099648/in-tikrit-
offensive-shiite-militias-form-unlikely-alliance. 
228 Wing, “MUSINGS ON IRAQ,” February 13, 2012. 
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E. BROKERAGE 
Similar to betweenness centrality, brokerage metrics take in account which actors 
occupy network positions by which they can control the flow of information and goods. 
Here actor brokerage is assessed using Borgatti’s key player algorithm229 and Gould and 
Fernandez’s brokerage role analysis.230 
Borgatti’s Key Player algorithms focus on how sets of actors contribute to a 
network’s cohesion. Two sets of measures exist. One (KPP-Negative) identifies the set of 
actors’ whose removal will most fragment the network, while the other (KPP-Positive) 
identifies the set of actors through whom material and nonmaterial resources are most 
likely to diffuse rapidly through the network.231 To identify the actors most critical to the 
spread of information and resources, we used the KPP-Positive algorithm to identify the 
set of five key players in the communication and colleagues and shared affiliations and 
events networks. The identified actors, then, are ideally located through each network in 
positions to control the flow of resources and press their control over others in the 
network. Of the top five actors identified, Fadhil al-Barwari, Osama al-Najafi, and Fuad 
Hussein stood out as accessible candidates; the other candidates mostly were centers of 
power for Iranian influence in the IDN.  
Conversely, the KPP-Negative algorithm identified those actors whose removal 
would break up the network. This information is certainly valuable in strategies to disrupt 
Iranian influence. The results in Table 4 confirm that the removal of top Iranian leaders 
would likely disrupt and fragment the network. This makes sense when considering the 
roles played by Zaidi, Ameri, and Soleimani, who have strong ties with each other as well 
as other Shia militia leaders and political actors in Iraq. The Key Players are listed in 
Tables 4 and 5. 
  
                                                 
229 Stephen P. Borgatti. 2006. “Identifying Sets of Key Players in a Social Network.” Computational, 
Mathematical and Organizational Theory 12:21-34. 
230 Roger V. Gould and Roberto M. Fernandez. 1989. “Structures of Mediation: A Formal Approach 
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231 Borgatti, “Key Players,” 22. 
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Table 4.   Communications and Colleagues Key Player Set 
Key Player (Positive) Key Player (Negative) 
Hadi al-Ameri Shebl al-Zaidi 
Haider al-Abadi Hadi al-Ameri 
Falih al-Fayyadh Gen. Qassem Soleimani 
Mohammed Salem al-Ghabban Haider al-Abadi 
Moqtada al-Sadr Falih al-Fayyadh 
 
Table 5.   Shared Organization and Event Key Player Set 
Key Player (Positive) Key Player (Negative) 
Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis Haider al-Abadi  
Osama al-Nujaifi Ali al-Jubouri 
Fadhil al-Barwari Fadhil al-Barwari 
Fuad Hussein -- 
Haidar Al-Gharab -- 
 
Brokerage between affiliation groups was also measured using the Gould and 
Fernandez brokerage role algorithm, which captures the importance that group affiliation 
plays in brokerage and are listed below in Table 6.232 While many of the top ranked 
nodes are Iranian-sponsored agents, actors such as Chaldani, Ali Dodah al-Jubouri and 
Ali al-Jubouri are possible candidates to approach due to their roles as consultant, 
coordinator, and gatekeeper, respectively. The role of Dodah al-Jubouri as an internal 
                                                 
232 Everton, Dark Networks, 277. 
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coordinator is appealing since his score indicates that he could be highly involved in 
organizing information and resources with the IDN. His role as a local mayor places him 
at the tactical, micro level that is not easily seen and merits further consideration. 
Table 6.   Gould and Fernandez Brokerage Scores 
 
RANK COORDINATOR GATEKEEPER REPRESENTATIVE CONSULTANT LIAISON TOTAL 
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The last form of brokerage noted in the IDN is not strictly an SNA measure but is 
important to the overall network. The recent development of bloc recruitment of entire 
militia groups under the major Shi’a militias sponsored by Iran is a clear example of the 
Iranian influence strategy at the tactical level. The bloc recruitment of groups who want 
to fight Daesh gives Iran and its sponsored militia groups access to already mobilized 
groups, allowing these Shi’a militias to rapidly increase their numbers and gain 
operational flexibility.233 Many of the groups joining under the Shi’a banner had 
requesting help from the central government, in some cases for years.234 By joining with 
the Shi’a militias, who are well supplied by the IRGC, militias instantly gain access to 
weapons, training, and other support to begin fighting immediately. This brokerage is 
occurring outside of areas where the U.S. has a foothold in Iraq, but where the fight 
against Daesh is still fierce in such places as Tikrit. The large Sunni population in the 
area presents an inviting opportunity for the U.S. to bring in more tribes to the PMP 
under its sponsorship rather than Iran’s. Group brokerage is shown below in Figure 15. 
  
                                                 
233 McAdam, “Chapter 3:  The Political Process Model,” 45. 
234 “Baghdad Blamed by MP for Mass Tribal Execution,” Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, November 1, 2014, 
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Figure 15.  Bloc Recruitment of Other Groups by Shi’a Militias 
 
F. SNA CONCLUSION 
In summary, analysis of the IDN shows that Iranian influence and power is felt 
throughout the entire network. At the senior leader and political official level, many pro-
Iranian figures hold positions of power or official office, and at the tactical level Iranian 
resources prove to be tempting for groups looking for support and patronage. Iranian 
influence is most concentrated within the political and militia subgroups in the IDN, 
which is reflective of the real life situation in Iraq. In addition, due to the lack of depth in 
cataloging actors within the Iraqi National Police, there are many possible ties back to 
Iranian influence due to historic ties with Shi’a political parties supportive of Iran such as 








closely with the PMP that is led by Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.235 This places the U.S. at 
odds with a firmly entrenched Iran regarding the contest of influence within Iraq. To best 
counter Iran’s growing influence, the U.S. needs to identify those actors within the 
network who are on the periphery of Iran’s core support group, that are also in a position 
of brokerage from which to take action and influence events on their own.  
A surprising finding was the discovery of actors such as Ali Dodah al-Jubouri, 
Sheikh Khaled al-Jbara, and Police Chief Ali al-Jubouri. These actors were all Sunni 
Arabs who were positively involved with hardline militias. These actors’ high centrality 
and brokerage scores would make them attractive candidates for recruitment, evident by 
the Shia militias’ decision to ally with these groups. A possible for this could have two 
reasons. First, securing Salahuddin Province is critical to campaign to defeat Daesh, since 
the province lies between Baghdad and Mosul. Any thrust north will likely take place 
along Highway 1, which runs straight through Salahuddin Province. For the Shia militia 
leadership, it makes sense to increase their numbers by recruiting allies among the tribes 
already fighting Daesh. Second, the recruitment of Sunni Arab allies is a shrewd decision 
for Iran, because these tribal militias represent an opportunity to increase Iran’s sway in 
Iraqi political circles. The sponsorship of Sunni tribal militias could have positive second 
order effects by increasing the number of leaders and politicians who view Iran’s 
involvement in the country in a positive and welcoming light. 
The recruitment of Jubouri tribes is also an opportunity for the U.S. as well. 
Outreach, recruitment and support of tribal militias in Salahuddin Province could be a 
possible starting point to begin pushing back at Iran. The reason for this is the area’s 
operational importance. The U.S. has focused its tribal reconciliation efforts on the Sunni 
Anbar tribes, yet this effort has yielded little in the way of strategic gains for the U.S. The 
                                                 
235 Although Falih al-Fayyadh is the titular head of the Popular Mobilization Committee, it is 
suspected that Muhandis controls the day-to-day operations of the PMP and coordinates between militia 
groups and the IRGC. For more information, see Liz Sly, “Pro-Iran Militias’ Success in Iraq Could 
Undermine U.S.,” The Washington Post, February 15, 2015, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iraqs-pro-iranian-shiite-militias-lead-the-war-against-
the-islamic-state/2015/02/15/5bbb1cf0-ac94-11e4-8876-460b1144cbc1_story.html; Kirk H. Sowell, “The 
Rise of Iraq’s Militia State”; Bill Roggio, “Iraqi Prime Minister Photographed with SDGT Abu Mahdi Al 




central government in Baghdad, mistrusting of empowering Sunnis, especially in Anbar 
province, has stalled the idea of creating a legitimized force of Sunni militias. The 
importance of Salahuddin Province, with its oil refineries in Baiji and strategic avenue of 
approach running north to Mosul, raises the stakes for Baghdad. Simply put, the central 
government may need the Sunnis of Salahuddin Province enough to consider 
empowering them with weapons and support. This in turn creates an opportunity for the 
U.S. to seize the initiative away from Iran by co-opting the militia fight. In Chapter V, 
this thesis suggests an approach based off the findings of the analysis of this chapter to 
assess and recommend a course of action. 
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V. A COUNTER-INFLUENCE STRATEGY 
Iranian influence is firmly embedded across Iraqi society. Because of this, a 
strategy that chooses to confront this influence with means such as relying solely on 
traditional military partnership is unlikely to work well. This situation calls for a bolder, 
more calculated approach using methods similar to Iran’s patronage of social and 
political groups to wield influence that isolate and bypass Iranian influence, turning 
Iran’s primary strategy into a modern-day Fort Eben Emael.236 Similarly, the U.S. must 
adopt a counter-influence approach that exploits Iran’s weaknesses in Iraq and the greater 
Middle East while at the same time leveraging U.S. strengths. This chapter outlines such 
an approach. It first introduces a new approach to unconventional warfare using SMT as 
a framework, and then uses this approach to analyze a candidate group, the al-Jubouri 
tribe of Iraq, to assess its potential for mobilization to counter Iranian influence. As we 
saw in the last chapter, actors of this tribe scored highly several brokerage and centrality 
metrics despite being outside of the inner circle of Iranian power. The chapter finally 
concludes this thesis by presenting overall findings, limitations, and recommendations for 
further study. 
A. THE SMT MODEL AS AN APPROACH TO CONDUCTING 
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE 
SMT offers a viable approach to countering Iranian influence in Iraq because of 
its focus on leveraging indigenous groups and organizations as means to achieving 
unconventional warfare goals. SMT offers three general advantages: (1) it offers a 
comprehensive framework on why and how revolutionary movements happen than can 
help explain how to best leverage existing indigenous movements; (2) it is a well-known 
tool in the academic world that shows how these movements sustain themselves, 
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providing valuable TTPs that can aid in the development of a UW campaign plan; and 
(3), it leverages the goals of existing movements by choosing or co-opting a movement’s 
narratives to become align with U.S. objectives, which gives the U.S. greater legitimacy 
by embracing local goals over its own outside goals.237 The focus on already established 
indigenous movements gives sponsors a greater chance of long-term success in coercing 
and disrupt targeted states, as opposed to UW operations that focus on raising surrogate 
forces from scratch to achieve short-term results, usually focusing on tactical-level 
kinetic effects. A current example of the latter type of operation is the US’s train and 
equip operation in Syria. In contrast to the methodology outlined in Chapter III, the U.S. 
applied the more traditional approach of creating ad hoc formations consisting of only 
those individuals who can pass an extensive screening process and then providing these 
recruits training along with U.S. equipment.238 While the Syrian campaign’s goals differ 
from those suitable for countering Iranian influence, the difference between a commando-
centric strategy and an SMT-based approach suggests that the former to the Iranian 
problem is unlikely to achieve substantial results.239 
While solely recruiting fighters will not likely disrupt Iranian influence, neither 
will randomly selecting already established tribal militias. Considering the strengths of 
Iran’s position in Iraq today, ad hoc sponsorship of groups who lack sufficient political 
power to fight against Daesh will not automatically reduce the level of Iranian influence 
in Iraq. As the previous chapter demonstrated, Iran is simply too entrenched, with 
multiple powerful indigenous groups as its main clients, to be challenged in such a 
haphazard manner. This is evident in the current emphasis on empowering 
disenfranchised Sunni groups to build a consensus of unity since the Iraqi central 
government is unwilling to trust the Anbar Sunni tribes, a mistrust echoed by disaffected 
                                                 
237 Doowan Lee and Glenn W. Johnson, “Revisiting the Social Movement Approach,” 2–3. 
238 Eric Schmitt and Ben Hubbard, “U.S. Revamping Rebel Force Fighting ISIS in Syria,” The New 
York Times, September 6, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/07/world/middleeast/us-to-revamp-
training-program-to-fight-isis.html. 
239 The Syrian Train and Equip Program was ended in October 2015 after its efforts to vet, train, and 
equip Syrian rebels yielded only 54 fighters, most of whom were killed or captured while attempting to re-
enter Syria. See Phil Stewart and Kate Holton, “U.S. Pulls Plug on Syria Rebel Training Effort; Will Focus 
on Weapons Supply,” Reuters, October 9, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/09/us-mideast-
crisis-syria-usa-idUSKCN0S31BR20151009. 
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Anbari leaders. This mutual distrust has already derailed the legacy of the Sunni 
Awakening movement, when Shia leaders moved quickly to dismantle the Awakening 
movement after the U.S. withdrawal.240 Furthermore, Iraq has already protested the US’s 
decision to directly arm and support tribal groups against Daesh, claiming that to arm 
Arab Sunni and Kurdish militias violates Iraqi sovereignty.241  
1. Application of the SMT Strategy
To counter Iranian influence, the SMT approach provides a potentially useful 
strategy. It is more readily aligned with the ultimate objective of a strategy of disrupting 
Iranian influence within Iraq, as opposed to the regime change strategies of other 
approaches.242 Lee and Johnson note that coercion is often more palatable to policy 
makers than regime change, especially in light of the recent experience in Iraq where an 
attempt at regime change turned into nation building.243 The SMT model divides its 
approach into four lines of operation that will be analyzed here: 
1. Deepening broad socio-economic grievances
2. Opening political opportunities by exploiting fractures between elite
political groups
3. Enhancing the effectiveness of selected indigenous organizations
4. Expanding strategic narratives244
SMT’s essential focus is the mobilization of selected groups and begins with the 
construction of a plan to assess candidate groups and select potential recruits. The 
assessment of candidate groups follows the four lines of operation mentioned above, 
using them as a framework to understand the group’s ability to successfully mobilize. 
This section develops an SMT-based strategy that first identifies potential social groups 
and organizations, analyzes their mobilization potential, and then assesses goals to 
240 Ahram and Wehrey, “Harnessing Militia Power.”
241 Ibid.
242 Lee and Johnson, “Revisiting the Social Movement Approach,” 4.
243 Ibid.
244 Adapted from Doowan Lee and Glenn W. Johnson, “Revisiting the Social Movement Approach.”
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determine if any group can become aligned with a sponsor’s goals.245 This is 
accomplished by first analyzing the results of the previous chapter’s human domain 
mapping efforts, using the sociograms such as the one shown in Figure 16 below to 
identify potential groups, and then exploring the groups’ political opportunities, 
indigenous strengths, and level of “insurgent consciousness.”246 Sociograms can help 
visualize the structure of the network’s social groups by displaying their leadership, 
connective linkages, and grassroots-level actors and sub-groups.247 
Figure 16.  Bloc Recruitment of Other Groups by Shi’a Militias 
By following Iran’s pathways of influence determined from the social network 
analysis, the U.S. can determine an appropriate starting point for its counterstrategy. 
Analysis of the IDN in Chapter IV demonstrated that at the micro-level, Iran is extending 
245 Ibid., 5.
246 Lee, “Social Movement Approach to UW,” 44–48; McAdam, “Chapter 3:  The Political Process
Model,” 40. 








its influence throughout Iraq through its outreach and sponsorship of tribal groups via the 
Shia militias. In Figure 1 above, Shia militias leaders such as Qais al-Khaz’ali recruited 
tribal groups led by Sheikh Khaled al-Jbara to fight Daesh in the lead up to re-take 
Tikrit.248 As Iraq looks to re-take Mosul, towns like al-Sharqat, which is located halfway 
between Tikrit and Mosul, may became important operational objectives. To press their 
offensive north, Iran-sponsored groups have also recruited other Sunni tribes from the 
area with several possible brokers at that level: Mayor Ali Dodah al-Jubouri249 and 
Salahuddin Province Deputy Chief of Security Khaled al-Khazraji.250 These two actors 
were among several officials with ties to Shia militias that scored in the top 10 for 
centrality and brokerage in the network. Their position as Sunnis outside of Anbar 
Province placed them in a tough position between Daesh and the IDN; these actors have 
been at the forefront of the fight to take back Salahuddin Province, and yet have not 
received the necessary support from either the U.S. or the central government.  
This situation presents an opening for U.S.—to begin outreach, assessment, and 
recruitment of similar groups under the larger Jubouri tribal federation in Salahuddin 
Province. In the case of the Jubouri tribe, which is one of the largest in Iraq is and located 
across the northern central area of the country,251 the lack of support from Baghdad has 
been evident since 2013, prompting them to finally accept aid in the form of weapons and 
support from Iranian-linked militias in villages and towns near Tikrit such as al-Sharqat 
and al-Alam.252 These tribal fighters had looked to the central government and the U.S. 
for support, but were instead forced to ally with Iranian-back Shi’a militias to facilitate 
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their battle against Daesh. This development represented an opportunity lost for the U.S. 
that could have been avoided. With Mosul as the next major Iraqi objective following 
successful operations in Ramadi, the Jubouri tribe of Salahuddin Province offers an 
attractive starting point to begin U.S. efforts to disrupt and counter Iranian influence, and 
is analyzed using the SMT approach below. 
B. THE JUBOURI TRIBE 
The Jubouris constitute one of the largest tribes in Iraq. Previously a Bedouin 
tribe, the Jubouris settled across Iraq, and are split between those who worship Sunni 
Islam in northern Iraq and those who are Shia in the south.253 The al-Jubouri tribe has 
traditionally been heavily involved in national-level politics, both as part of the ruling 
elite and as challengers. The Jubouri tribe also has a long history of resisting 
oppression—in 1990 Misha’an al-Jubouri, who held a place of high esteem in Saddam 
Hussein’s inner circle, was implicated in a coup attempt.254 The Jubouri tribe went from 
occupying a high place of trust within the regime to executing a series of attempts on 
Hussein’s life, described by former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker as some of the 
most significant ever attempted.255 Following this, Hussein punished the Jubouri tribe 
and many of the tribe’s members who had occupied high positions of power and 
patronage by removing them from the regime. Later, during the U.S. occupation of Iraq 
from 2003–2011, al-Jubouri tribal members fought against al-Qaeda alongside the U.S. as 
members of the Sahwa (“Awakening”) movement.256 Jubouri leaders at all levels were 
involved with the Sahwa movement in 2007–2009; however when the Maliki government 
reneged on its promises to integrate the movement into the federal government and then 
began persecuting Sahwa leaders.257 Despite receiving no support from Baghdad, many 
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Jubouris chose to fight when Daesh made its advance east into Iraq. Leaders such as Abu 
Abir al-Jubouri typify the current attitude concerning the crisis—the tribal leaders do not 
trust the government, yet are forced to request its assistance to protect their homes.258  
1. Political Opportunities and the al-Jubouri Tribe 
Just as is the case with virtually every other group fighting in Iraq, Daesh’s 
success on the battlefield and the political landscape has created a powerful incentive for 
the Jubouri tribe to mobilize for collective action. The inability of the Iraqi Security 
Forces to contain and defeat Daesh created the need for additional forces, resulting in a 
crisis for Iraq that, in turn, has provided an opportunity for some groups to act, which was 
reinforced by the fatwa issued by Ayatollah al-Sistani in 2014 calling for Shiites to join 
Iraq’s security forces.259 Increased legitimization of tribal groups is now building on this. 
In April of this year, Prime Minister Abadi secured a vote to place the office of the Prime 
Minister as the commander-in-chief of the PMU, with authorities to lead, control, and 
organize the mobilization forces.260 The popular mobilization units having achieved great 
success against Daesh, Abadi moved to place them more firmly under state control. With 
the recognition of importance has come critical resources that other tribes can take 
advantage of.261 The Abadi administration has allocated $1 billion to the PMP, making it 
possible for the Jubouri tribes, who were essentially forced to ally with Shia militias with 
access to equipment and funding262 a chance to legitimately mobilize. This also creates 
an opportunity for the U.S. to attack Iran’s influence over the program—wielded by 
senior officials like Muhandis and Ameri—by allowing it to approach the Iraqi 
government about more directly assisting compatible groups, especially since the U.S. 
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has had issues with the central Iraqi government over providing direct aid without the 
approval of the central government.263 Direct support of approved militia groups with 
equipment, training, and air support may become the best venue for the U.S. to 
competing against Iran. 
2. The Organizational Strength of the al-Jubouri Tribe 
The Jubouri tribe’s organizational strength lies in its potential ability to convert 
political opportunities into organized action.264 Without this conversion potential its 
ability to conduct in any type of mass action will be “…little more than ‘short term, 
localized, ephemeral outbursts’…”265 Here the tribe’s mobilization potential is analyzed 
in terms of some of the key resources identified by McAdam: group membership and 
solidary incentives. 
Group membership within the Jubouri tribal structure is plentiful, with the 
primary membership consisting of the tribe members themselves. While the incentive to 
defend their homeland is a powerful incentive for the Jubouri tribe, its greatest strength is 
its political organization. The Jubouri tribe’s strong, geographically focused organization 
promotes the Jubouris over other tribal confederations like the Dulaym tribes of Anbar 
Province, which are spread out across Iraq and other countries. The Dulaym tribal 
confederation has also suffered from its confrontation with the Maliki government over 
promised support of the Sahwa program. What separates the Jubouris from the Dulaym 
tribal leadership in this matter is that the central government and the Anbar sheikhs were 
unable to come to a resolution. The crackdown on protests in 2013266 resulted in the 
Dulaymi sheikhs forming the Anbar Tribal Revolutionary Council, which pledged to 
protect Anbar Sunnis from the government, which only increased the central 
government’s distrust of the Anbar Sheikhs. The Jubouris, on the other hand, did not 
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confront the government, and today hold office at several levels within the Iraqi 
government ranging from the mayor of al-Sharqat village Ali Dodah al-Jabouri to the 
Speaker of the Iraqi Parliament, Dr. Salim Abdullah al-Jubouri.267 The Jubouri tribal 
history of heavy involvement in politics has likely resulted in a culture that values 
activism and makes key leaders more open to recruitment. The fact that many tribal 
leaders—not just those in the Jubouri tribe—are upset by the lack of U.S. involvement 
and support,268 may present the U.S. an opportunity to lure groups away from Iranian-
backed militias and recruit unaffiliated groups by offering enticements greater than those 
offered by Iran.  
The Jubouri tribe’s organizational structure lends itself to the bloc recruitment of 
smaller groups within the greater tribe. As noted in the previous chapter, bloc recruitment 
is the recruitment of complete organizations rather than single individuals.269 One 
method to utilize this type of recruitment would be reaching out to upper-level officials 
within Salahuddin province—where the Jubouris hold senior positions in the offices of 
the governor, security councils—as well as to smaller villages and towns. Successfully 
recruiting fighters and commanders from smaller villages would lessen the difficulties 
that U.S. trainers face with ad hoc units by ensuring that fighters are vetted by their 
leaders and thus allowing the U.S. to accept more risk regarding the fighters’ reliability. 
This could reduce the time needed by the U.S. to train and fully mobilize new fighter 
units and build combat power up more quickly.   
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3. Jubouri Cognitive Liberation 
Properly framing a narrative that enables the Jubouri tribe to accept U.S. 
sponsorship and mobilize its fighters will present some challenges. The U.S. will need to 
deal with the general feelings of mistrust towards both the U.S. and the Iraqi central 
government that currently exists in the minds of tribe members.270 The U.S. also needs to 
build a convincing enough case for sheiks to overcome any fears of retaliation271 by 
Daesh and provide some credible evidence or plan that the central government is working 
to support the tribe with salaries, weapons and training. Unfortunately, while the effort to 
integrate tribes from Anbar province seems to be making progress, there still exist 
inadequacies in the central government’s ability to pay the tribal fighters it has 
recruited.272 Ironically, the Jubouri tribe should need little convincing of the need to 
mobilize—it has been fighting Daesh in Salahuddin province since 2013 and some 
villages have been repeatedly punished for trying to overthrow their Daesh 
conquerors.273 However, the prognostic frame needs to blend Jubouri concerns for the 
future, namely integration and support of its fighters by the central government, into a 
suitable motivational frame in order to provide the groups a reason to join together.274 
One way this can be accomplished is for the Iraqi government to simply improve the 
mechanisms for supporting militia groups. To assist with this, it is imperative that the 
U.S. press forward with efforts to reconcile Sunni tribes with the Shia government. This 
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goes beyond simply enrolling tribes into a national guard, and deals more with 
reestablishing trust between the government and the governed.275 The larger issue with 
arming Sunni militias in today’s Iraq is one of trust. Neither the central government nor 
the armed group can trust each other, and what results is seen today where Jubouri tribal 
leaders need weapons but don’t trust the government, and efforts to formally integrate 
these groups is resisted in the Iraqi Council of Representatives.276 Building a narrative 
frame around trust and reconciliation, then, becomes the highest priority to frame the 
debate over mobilization. 
A second framing narrative that should be introduced is that Iranian-backed Shia 
militias will only cause more problems than they solve. An example of this would be the 
reports of Shia militias looting stores and destroying homes in the wake of the liberation 
of Tikrit.277 Diagnostic framing themes to support this narrative could include anger over 
the forced displacement of Sunni families from areas liberated by Shia militias by 
ransacking homes, businesses, and mosques.278 No convincing of the veracity of these 
allegations needs to take place as the events are well documented. To fix this it should be 
made clear that non-Iranian sponsored forces are required to defeat Daesh and properly 
re-establish stability. It should also be emphasized that those who join with the ISF or 
US-back militias get better training, equipment, and partnership than they could expect 
from Iran. The U.S. can point the recent example of Tikrit to show that without the US’s 
air power, which is only given to “official” Iraqi forces, i.e., those not backed by Iran, 
any planned offensive will ultimately stall and be costly in terms of lives lost. 
Through analyzing the opportunities, strengths, and possible framing narratives, 
the political process model shows that the Jubouri tribe is a potential candidate for U.S. 
support. Assisting the Jubouri in accomplishing its goal of defending its homeland and 
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becoming more supported by the central government in Baghdad could also facilitate a 
counter-influence strategy against Iran, which depends on its militias to exert political 
influence within the country. The U.S. faces a dilemma regarding its strategy to counter 
Iranian influence. The simplest answer involves a large troop commitment in Iraq (as 
well as Syria), however that option is politically infeasible. Worse, the IRGC through its 
Quds Force has successfully been able to leverage the powerful Shia militias to keep the 
Iraqi government under its influence and has caused numerous U.S. casualties during its 
occupation there from 2003 to 2011.  
None of this is to suggest that Iran is omnipotent, however. The IRGC’s 
facilitation of Maliki’s sectarian agenda partially created the conditions that allowed 
Daesh to rapidly seize large swaths of Iraqi territory, a crucial miscalculation that has 
drawn the IRGC back into Iraq to contain the threat to its own borders. Iran took 
advantage of the situation by co-opting the recently created Popular Mobilization 
Committee; however, the recent offensive in Tikrit has revealed the limits of Iranian 
power. Without U.S. air support, the offensive ground to a halt and the militias suffered 
heavy casualties before being ordered to pull back by Prime Minister Abadi in order to 
meet the conditions of U.S. participation in the offensive. That the offensive resumed 
speaks volumes about the desperate situation the Iraqi leadership is in; they are willing to 
risk angering one of their main partners and powerful surrogates in order to win. This 
moment also represents an opportunity of huge potential for the U.S. as well—not every 
militia pulled out in protest, signaling that some are comfortable with U.S. involvement. 
With the proper approach, this opportunity can be seized and allow the U.S. to take a 
significant step towards disrupting the IRGC’s hold on Iraq. 
If Iran’s center of gravity in Iraq is the power it wields through its surrogates, then 
only a strategy that attacks that source of power can counter it. This is what makes the 
SMT approach such a viable strategy to disrupt Iran’s influence. Through its emphasis on 
working through already established groups that can wield political power, an SMT 
approach directly challenges Iran’s hold on Iraq by recruiting more groups to the US’s 
cause and disrupting and reducing the amount of political power held by Iranian-backed 
political groups.  
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C. CONCLUSION 
1. Overall Findings 
This study has traced the pathways of Iranian influence in Iraq, starting from its 
roots through today. Beginning with the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, Iran has made 
sponsorship of oppositional parties the centerpiece of its campaign to achieve its strategic 
goals in Iraq. Chapter III of this thesis showed, through the SMT framework of 
McAdam’s political process model, how Iran took advantage of a shared religious 
heritage and converging goals to successfully co-opt the Islamic Da’wa Party, sponsoring 
their efforts to fight against Saddam Hussein. Later, when the Da’wa Party’s goals 
diverged from Iran’s doctrine of vilayat-e faqih,279 Iran was able to pull members away 
from the Da’wa Party to create the SCIRI. These two groups have since been employed 
by Iran as the main avenue of its influence. Later, during the U.S. occupation of Iraq from 
2003–2011, Iran used these groups to facilitate the establishment of a Shia government 
led by Da’wa Party leader Nouri al-Maliki, whose has been supported since 2005 by 
Qassem Soleimani of the Quds force. In addition to manipulating the politics of the 
country, Iran conducted a sophisticated asymmetric warfare campaign against the U.S. 
led by such agents as Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, which culminated in the successful 
prevention of a security agreement that forced the U.S. to leave the country. Now that 
Iraq is in crisis again following the invasion of Daesh, Iran is closer than ever to 
achieving a permanent client state in Iraq with the legitimization of its sponsored Shia 
militias, reminiscent of the Hezbollahization of Lebanon. 
The pathways of Iranian influence were also traced using the personal network 
developed and maintained by the IRGC. Chapter IV analyzed this by mapping the 
network of actors within Iraq focused on combatting Daesh. As expected, the Shia militia 
leadership was found to be highly central within the network. Politicians and militia 
leaders such as Hadi al-Ameri and Qais al-Khaz’ali scored higher in brokerage measures 
than non-Shia politicians, indicative of the power held by this faction within Iraq. Micro-
level brokerage was explored to understand the mechanics of how Iran is able to extend 
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its reach, and found that the Shia militias were conducting bloc recruitment of Sunni and 
Christian militias in areas like Salahuddin Province that are operationally vital to the 
campaign to eliminate Daesh. SNA was critical to the understanding of that led to the 
discovery of tribes such as those under the al-Jubouri tribal confederation as a possible 
means to counter Iranian influence within the network because of SNA’s ability to place 
actors within the network according to their importance. Sunni tribal leaders outside of 
the Jubouri, while having roughly the same types and number of ties, were found to be of 
less importance. This is significant because of the U.S. experience in Iraq, which focused 
so heavily on Anbar tribes for support that today lack the geographic and social potential 
to impact Iranian influence that Jubouri tribes have.  
The exploration of micro-level brokerage provided insight into ways to possibly 
disrupt and counter this influence. Noting the bloc recruitment occurring among tribal 
groups that were non-Shia, this study analyzed a candidate group that could be mobilized 
and leveraged by the U.S. to counter Iranian influence. Using the SMT approach to UW 
developed by Lee, Chapter V analyzed the al-Jubouri tribe at large to understand its 
mobilization potential, finding that this tribe held unique political opportunities created 
by the rise of Daesh and the government’s need for militia support, and was organized in 
sufficient strength that with proper narrative framing by the US, this group could serve as 
a potential counterweight to Iran’s influence. Similar to SNA, SMT was also highly 
important to properly assess candidate social groups for the creation of a counter-Iranian 
influence strategy. The factors used to understand Iran’s success in sponsoring the 
Islamic Da’wa and SCIRI were also the key to evaluating the Jubouri potential for 
mobilization. SMT allowed for an understanding of not only the Jubouri tribe’s key 
strengths but also its ability to act and its unifying narratives, without which would give 
only a partial view of the tribe’s suitability for U.S. support. Without the use of SMT, the 
U.S. risks sponsoring groups that are unable to convert similar opportunities into action, 
or lack the internal organization to sustain desired effects. 
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2. Limitations 
This study was limited by two factors. The use SNA to understand a network 
requires that data available to record and study relationships. However, the major source 
of information for this study, open source news media reports, generally contained 
limited amounts of relational data. Therefore, this study was unable to assume that all 
information pertaining to its network was available and correct. While the news reports 
referenced were generally accurate, this accuracy was not consistent, and was often 
biased based on the views of the particular organization reporting it. Finally, some 
relational ties were inferred using the author’s subjective experience. While usually ties 
like organizational and affiliation ties were considered straightforward, ties involving 
trust or mutual respect and affection were often inferred, and are subject to the author’s 
own bias. To mitigate these limitations, the author cross-referenced the relational ties 
using multiple sources, and discriminated amongst the source material to maximize the 
use of reporting from established, reputable news organizations and minimized the use 
uncreditable sources like social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. 
3. Recommendations for Further Study 
To further support this strategy, additional social network analysis is 
recommended in two key networks: the al-Jubouri tribal network in Salahuddin province 
and the Iraqi National Police leadership. The former is recommended in order to further 
illuminate the network of potential allies for the campaign to re-take Mosul. The latter is 
recommended in order to cast more light on the extent of Iranian influence throughout the 
Iraqi government. The Ministry of the Interior will likely remain a haven for Shia 
political organizations with strong ties to Iran. In the past this ministry was used to 
legitimize Shia sectarian killings of Sunnis, and it will likely remain susceptible to Iran’s 
influence in the future. For example, if Iran were to suddenly find its influence 
diminished within the Popular Mobilization Units, it would most likely find support in 
the upper ranks of the Ministry of the Interior. By mapping the human terrain within Iraq, 
the U.S. will be better equipped to detect such shifts in political influence, and will be 
able to act accordingly. The synthesis of SNA and SMT with unconventional warfare can 
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further our understanding of the environment in the Middle East and will enable the 




APPENDIX. PROJECT CODEBOOK 
The project codebook was designed by Associate Professor Dan Cunningham, 
CORE Lab, Defense Analysis Department, as part of this study’s project team. 
A. RELATIONSHIPS 
1. AFFILIATED INDIVIDUALS IN SCHOOL/UNIVERSITY (person-to-
person) –Two or more individuals who receive formal education, serve as 
an employee (teacher, admin, etc.) and/or are involved in additional 
educational instruction at the same institution and at the same time. 
2. AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS IN SCHOOL/UNIVERSITY (person-
to-organization) – Defined as a relationship between an individual and an 
educational institution where the individual attends, works at (teacher, 
admin, etc.), or receives additional educational instruction at the 
institution. 
3. BUSINESS AFFILIATIONS (person-to-organization) – Defined as an 
individual’s employment at or ownership of a profit and/or non-profit 
commercial organization. 
4. BUSINESS PARTNERS (person-to-person) – Defined as two or more 
individuals who have direct financial and commercial interests with one 
another outside of marriage. 
5. COLLEAGUES (person-to-person) – Defined as two or more individuals 
who work directly with one another, but who do not necessarily have 
direct financial interests with one another. 
6. COMMUNICATION (person-to-person) – Defined as the relaying of 
messages between individuals inside the network through some sort of 
medium, such as a cellular telephone or email. 
7. EVENTS (person-to-event) – Defined as a person’s participation in a 
political event, meeting or operation. Please record the event’s date, a two-
to-three word description and the location if possible. For example, Dan 
participated in a political event titled “1/15/14_CORE Lab 
Meeting_Monterey, CA.” 
8. GOVERNMENT AFFILIATION (person-to-organization) – Defined as an 
individual’s employment or allegiance to a specific government body. 
This option does NOT include military or educational government bodies 
(See Military Affiliation and Affiliated Organizations in 
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School/University). Please be as specific as possible (i.e., Booze Allen 
Hamilton’s Research Office as oppose to Booze Allen Hamilton). 
9. KINSHIP (person-to-person) - Kinship is defined as any family 
connection through blood or marriage. Examples include, but are not 
limited to, children, parents, siblings, mother and father-in-laws, uncles, 
aunts, and grandparents. 
10.  MENTORSHIP (person-to-person) –Defined as a relationship where an 
individual looks to another individual for educational, spiritual and/or 
technical advice, guidance and/or expertise. 
11. MILITARY AFFILIATION (person-to-organization) – A relationship 
where an individual is employed by a specific military organization. 
Please be as specific as possible (i.e. Naval Postgraduate School’s CORE 
Lab as oppose to Naval Postgraduate School). 
12. NONPOLITICAL AFFILIATIONS (person-to-organization) – An 
individual’s employment or allegiance to a specific organization that fits 
neither the criteria of a political organization nor any other type listed in 
the dossier (i.e., academic, commercial organization, military, political and 
government). 
13. POLITICAL ALLIES (person-to-person) – An individual’s close and 
explicit political alliance with another individual to include joint-
campaigns, political statements claiming support, etc. 
14. POLITICAL MOVEMENTS AFFILIATION (person-to-organization) – 
An individual’s membership and/or direct support to a group that seeks to 
obtain political goals generally through non-violent means, including 
political parties. 
15. RELIGIOUS AFFILIATIONS (person-to-organization) – Religious 
relations are defined as an individual’s membership or allegiance to a 
specific mosque, church, synagogue or religious study circle. 
16. SUPERIOR-SUBORDINATE (person-to-person) – Defined as 
relationships between immediate superiors and subordinates in a network. 
This relationship is essentially a “Reports to” relationship and is meant to 
account for formal/hierarchical ties within a network. Please record the 
“superior” actor in the “Superior-Subordinate” column. 
17. TERRORIST ORGANIZATION AFFILIATION (person-to-organization) 
– Defined as an individual’s membership in an organization that uses 
violence against a civil population to cause fear for the purpose of 
bringing about political change. 
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18. TRIBAL AFFILIATION (person-to-organization) – Defined as an 
individual’s membership or claim to be a member of a tribe or ethnic 
group. 
19. TRUST (person-to-person) – Defined as two individuals who are 
explicitly stated as friends or who are explicitly known as trusted 
associates. 
20. MISCELLANEOUS (person-to-person) - Defined as relationship between 
two individuals that does not fall within the definition of any other option 
listed in the code book. 
B. ATTRIBUTES 
1. ALSO KNOWN AS – An alternative by which the individuals is known. 
Coding Scheme (list the full alternative name) 
2. ARREST/INCARCERATION/EXILE RECORDS – An individual’s 
arrest and/or exile history. 
(a) Arrest/Incarceration History  
(b) Arrested/Incarcerated – The individual is currently under arrest or 
incarcerated. 
 
3. EXILE HISTORY – The individual was in exile in the past. 
(a) Exiled – The individual is currently in exile from their home country. 
(b) Exile and Arrest/Incarceration History – The actor has been both exiled 
and arrested in the past. Please add the specific dates in the “Notes” 
column of the Excel workbook provided to you in class. 
 
4. CITIZENSHIP – Defined as the country in which an individual was born 
and/or claims citizenship status 
5. EDUCATION – Defined as the highest degree of education attained by 
the individual. 
(a) Less than High School 
(b) High School 
(c) University 
(d) Graduate (Masters) 
(e) Graduate (PhD) 
 
6. ETHNICITY – An actor’s ethnic group. 
7. LANGUAGES – The language (s) an individual speaks, reads and/or 
writes. 
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8. LOCATION (CURRENT) – An individual’s current place of residence. 
Please include the most micro location as possible; for example, list 
“Monterey, California, United States” as oppose to “California.” 
9. LOCATION (PAST) – An individual’s former place of residence. Please 
include the most micro location as possible; for example, list “Monterey, 
California, United States” as oppose to “California.” 
10. MILITARY SERVICE – An individual’s military service history. 
11. OCCUPATION - Defined as an individual’s current functional title of 
employment. Coding Scheme (list the specific occupation (i.e. Plumber)) 
12. POLITICAL POSITIONS (CURRENT) – Any current political office 
positions held by an individual. 
13. POLITICAL POSITIONS (PAST) – Any current political office positions 
held by an individual in the past and that he or she no longer holds. 
14. POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS CONSISTENCY – Defined as the 
motivations for political support and activism, including monetary, 
ideology, coercion, ego, family, tribe, ethnic, and personal loyalty. The 
coding schemes for a-c contain the same options. Note you can list 
multiple motivations separated by a comma (i.e., monetary, ego, family). 
15. POLITICAL SPEECHES AND STATEMENTS – Important political 
speeches made by an individual. Political speeches are defined as those 
where the main theme is political in nature. 
16. RELIGION – Defined as the actor’s specific religion (please include the 
most specific religion as possible). 
17. STATUS – Defined as the physical condition of the individual. The 
default is “alive” if there is a lack of information. Add any additional 
information (i.e. “Abu was shot and surrendered to the police”) to the 
notes section. Coding Scale: (leave blank for “alive”) 
(a) Deceased 
(b) Suspected Deceased 
(c) Detained (jailed, arrested) 
 
18. TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONAL ROLE – Defined as the role an 
individual assumes in the terrorist/insurgent network. Of course, coding 
several roles is permitted given most actors hold more than one role. 
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